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SOX, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT: SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
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"Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with
the utmost care." Dimick v. Schiedt1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early part of the twenty-first century, corporate fraud and greed
led to the downfall of two major multinational corporations, Enron and
WorldCom.2 Corporate scandals caught the attention of the general public,
corporations, Wall Street, and Congress like few scandals ever have
before.' The primary victims of the scandals-company employees,
investors, and pensioners- suffered greatly from the companies' deceptive
practices and ultimate collapses.4  Investigations into these debacles
revealed that certain employees in these companies had identified the
fraudulent practices that ultimately led to the destruction of their
corporations, 5 yet these employees were discouraged from reporting the
practices because of a lack of legal protection for whistleblowers.6 The few
* Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law; B.B.A., summa
cum laude, University of Oklahoma, 1997; J.D., with highest honors, University of
Oklahoma College of Law, 2000. Many thanks to Joseph Moody and Hannah Sussman for
research assistance and Sandra Sperino from Saint Louis University School of Law for
comments and suggestions concerning prior drafts of this article. I am solely responsible for
any mistakes or errors that appear.
1. 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
2. STEPHEN M. KOHN, MICHAEL D. KOHN, AND DAVID K. COLAPINTO, WHISTLEBLOWER
LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES, at xi (2004).
3. See, e.g., McGarrity v. Berlin Metals, Inc., 774 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
("With the sole exception of the war on terrorism, no issue dominates current thought more
than the corporate and accountancy ethical scandals which have rocked our country.").
4. KOHN, supra note 2, at xii.
5. Id.
6. Id. Although a variety of federal and state laws provide protection for certain types
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corporate insiders who risked their careers in an attempt to correct the
fraudulent practices, Cynthia Cooper and Sherron Watkins, were hailed as
heroes by Time Magazine in 2002.' Congress, responding to the outcry
from the general public, acted swiftly to provide comprehensive federal
protection for corporate employees who reported corporate fraud by
enacting the Public Company Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002,
commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 8 On July 30, 2002, President
Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law.9 The Act aimed to destroy
the "corporate code of silence" promoted by the lack of comprehensive
legal protection for corporate whistleblowers.'l
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") contains four key provisions
designed to protect whistleblowers. Section 806 of the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, contains a traditional civil anti-retaliation provision.
Employers covered by SOX, including publicly traded corporations and
their contractors, subcontractors, and agents, are prohibited from retaliating
against employees who report suspected corporate fraud or Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) violations." The civil protections are limited
to employees of publicly traded companies. 12 In addition to civil liability,
SOX criminalizes retaliation against employee whistleblowers. Under the
amended obstruction of justice statute, any person who
knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful
to any person, including interference with the lawful employment
or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement
officer any truthful information relating to the commission or
possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under
of whistleblowers, neither Texas state law nor federal law protected the whistleblowers of
Enron and WorldCom.
7. Richard Lacayo and Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 22, 2002, at
30.
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
9. Statement by President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 3763, 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1286 (July 30, 2002).
10. KoHN,supra note 2, at xiii.
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2002)).
Section 806 of SOX was originally drafted by the Senate Judiciary Committee as Section
806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002. KOHN, supra note 2,
at 4. The corporate whistleblower provision, passed unanimously by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, was incorporated into the final version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by way of the
Leahy-McCain Amendment. KOHN, supra note 2, at 4. The Senate adopted the amendment
on July 25, 2002. 148 CONG. REC. S7365-02 (daily ed. July 25, 2002). Senator Patrick
Leahy was the principal sponsor of the corporate whistleblower law. KOHN, supra note 2,,
at 4.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2000)
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this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 3
In addition, SOX prohibits retaliation against corporate whistleblowers who
complain to auditing committees concerning questionable accounting
practices. 14  Finally, attorneys who practice before the Securities and
Exchange Commission are now required to "report evidence of a material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation
by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof)."'
5
The heart of the whistleblower protection offered by SOX is the anti-
retaliation provision contained in section 806. Section 806 adopts a two-
track enforcement system that is unique in employment discrimination law.
The first track is similar to the administrative procedures available under
the whistleblower provisions of other federal statutes.' 6  The corporate
whistleblower can file an administrative complaint with the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) 17 and an OSHA investigator will
investigate the complaint and make findings. 8 Objections to the findings
of an OSHA investigator are filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge
in the United States Department of Labor. 9 Administrative hearings are
conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in accordance with the
rules of practice and procedure for administrative hearings before the
Office of Administrative Law Judges.20 The ALJ's decision can be
appealed to the Administrative Review Board (acting on behalf of the
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2000).
14. KoHN, supra note 2, at xiii.
15. 15 U.S.C. §7245 (2000).
16. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2002) (Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century); 49 U.S.C. § 60129 (2002) (Pipeline Safety Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1977) (Clean
Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1992) (Energy Reorganization Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1980)
(Solid Waste Disposal Act); 5 U.S.C. § 1221 (1994) (Whistleblower Protection Act).
17. See, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring complaints to be filed with
Secretary of the Department of Labor). The Secretary delegated to the Assistant Secretary
of OSHA the responsibility to receive and investigate SOX complaints. Order Delegating
Responsibility for Administration of SOX Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 65008 (Oct. 22, 2002).
18. See 18 U.S.C. §1514A(b)(2)(A) (requiring that the procedure used shall be the same
as found in 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(1)). The rules and regulations concerning the SOX
administrative procedure generally follow the rules and procedures set forth in the employee
protection provisions of the AIR 21 Act, which Congress enacted to protect airline
employees engaged in protected whistleblowing activities from retaliation by air carriers; 49
U.S.C. § 42121 (b). OSHA promulgated regulations that govern procedures and time frames
for handling discrimination complaints under Title VIII of Sarbanes-Oxley. 69 Fed. Reg.
52,104 (Aug. 24, 2004). See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103 (2005) (detailing regulations for filing of
discrimination complaint); § 1980.104 (creating procedures for investigating complaints); §
1980.105 (detailing procedures for issuance of findings and preliminary orders).
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.106(a) (detailing the procedure for objecting to a preliminary
order).
20. Id. at § 1980.107 (requiring hearings to be conducted in accordance with the rules
codified in 29 C.F.R. § 18(A)).
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Secretary of Labor).2' Judicial review of the Administrative Review
Board's decision is available in the appropriate federal court of appeals.
22
Unlike other federal whistleblower statutes, an option exists
permitting a SOX complainant to take his or her case to federal court if the
Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision on the administrative
complaint "within 180 days of the filing of the complaint and there is no
showing that such delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant., 23  The
whistleblower provision gives claimants in that situation the right to bring
"an action at law or equity for de novo review" in the appropriate federal
district court, regardless of the amount in controversy.24 In short, the
claimant may re-file the case in federal district court if the case is litigated
for at least 180 days within the Department of Labor (DOL) without a final
ruling, so long as the claimant does not engage in any "bad faith" conduct
designed to delay DOL proceedings. One commentator claims that
Congress provided the right to re-file because prior claims filed under other
federal whistleblower laws and administered by the DOL tended to
languish within the department for years.25 The federal court escape clause
allows claimants to bypass that particular problem.
26
Although SOX provides for a private right of action in federal court
under the above-described conditions, the statute does not explicitly state
whether such an action can be tried before a jury.27 Senator Leahy, the
principal sponsor and author of the SOX whistleblower provision,
introduced legislative history supporting the congressional intent to provide
the right to a jury trial.28 However, the lack of an explicit guarantee in the
21. Id. at § 1980.110 (stating that requests for review must be filed with the
Administrative Review Board).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (2000) (delineating procedure governed by 49
U.S.C. § 42121(b)); 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4)(A) (2002) ("Any person adversely affected or
aggrieved by a [final order issued by the Secretary of the Department of Labor] may obtain
review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the
violation, with respect to which the order was issued, allegedly occurred or the circuit in
which the complainant resided on the date of such violation.").
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A)-(B)
24. Id.
25. KOHN, supra note 2, at 8.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (granting the right to bring a SOX
whistleblower action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court)
with 42 U.S.C. § 198la(c) (2000) ("If a complaining party [Title VII plaintiff] seeks
compensatory or punitive damages under this section- any party may demand a trial by
jury.").
28. 148 CONG. REG. S7420, 7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) ("Only if there is not final
agency decision within 180 days of the complaint (and such delay is not shown to be due to
the bad faith of the claimant) may he or she [ ] bring a de novo case in federal court with a
jury trial available (See United States Constitution, Amendment VII; Title 42 United States
Code, Section 1983).").
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statute casts doubt on whether federal courts will uniformly interpret the
statute or the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to guarantee the
right to a jury trial. A federal district court in Texas has interpreted the
statute as failing to provide the right to a jury trial. 29 The Texas court
concluded that the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee the right to a
jury trial because the statutory remedies are limited to equitable relief.3"
Other federal district courts have noted the issue as one of first impression,
but postponed ruling on the question.3' If the first few instances of judicial
interpretation of the private right of action are any indication of what is to
come, the federal courts will undoubtedly struggle with the jury trial issue
in SOX, just as they have with other federal employment discrimination
statutes that do not explicitly provide the right to a jury trial.3
Congress provided SOX whistleblowers with a private right of action
allowing them to bring an action at law to seek legal relief in the form of
back pay and special damages, such as for mental anguish, as well as an
29. Murray v. TXU Corp., 2005 WL 135433, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2005).
30. Id. at *3 (holding that SOX does not provide for special or punitive damages).
31. See Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int'l, 417 F. Supp. 2d 310, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(dismissing motion for jury trial without prejudice, pending consideration of the issue by
other courts); Hanna v. WCI Comtys., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(denying motion for jury trial until all other motions have been ruled upon prior to trial).
32. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978) (finding statutory right to jury trial
in a private civil action for lost wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) even though the ADEA contains no provision expressly granting a right to jury
trial); Lebow v. Am. Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661, 672 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to jury trial for employees suing their employers
under the Railway Labor Act for discharge resulting from union-related activities); Waldrop
v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 157 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (holding that jury trials are
constitutionally required for actions at law under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Hill
v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1 lth Cir. 1991) (finding the Jury Systems
Improvement Act, a jury-duty discrimination statute, provides a right to jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment); Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 1993) (deeming jury
trials not required for Employee Retirement Income Security Act Section (ERISA) 510
claims because ERISA rights are essentially equitable in nature); Troy v. City of Hampton,
756 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985) (denying the existence of a constitutional right to a jury
trial in actions for reinstatement and lost wages under the Veterans Reemployment Rights
Act); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)
(providing evidence that pre-1991 Civil Rights Act cases were held not to require jury trials
in a Title VII action for reinstatement and backpay). Cf. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
198 (1974) (stating a damages suit under Section 812 of the Civil Rights of 1968 is an
action to enforce "legal rights" and thus Seventh Amendment preserved the litigant's right
to a jury trial). See also Denise Drake Clemow & Lisa Hund Lattan, ERISA Section 510
Claims: No Right to a Jury Trial Can Be Found, 73 NEB. L. REv. 756, 778 (1994) (claiming
that no constitutional right to jury trial exists for Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Section 510 claims because remedies provided by Congress are only equitable); Robert L.
Strayer, II, Note, Asserting the Seventh Amendment: An Argument for the Right to a Jury
Trial When Only Back Pay is Sought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 VAND.
L. REv. 795, 796 (1999) (arguing that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury on
Americans with Disabilities Act backpay claims).
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action at equity to seek reinstatement, a clearly equitable remedy, if the
180-day DOL decision deadline is not met. As a matter of statutory
interpretation, the statutory structure and language, and the legislative
history indicate that the right to a jury trial applies in situations where the
relief sought includes backpay or non-pecuniary damages. Judicial
interpretation implying the right to a jury trial is sensible and avoids a
direct confrontation with the Seventh Amendment. However, even if the
Seventh Amendment is squarely confronted, the result is the same. SOX
whistleblowers who seek backpay and other special damages have the
constitutional right to a trial by jury because they seek to enforce legal
rights to legal relief. Backpay under SOX is the quintessential legal
remedy. As a practical matter, SOX whistleblower actions should routinely
be tried to juries even when SOX plaintiffs seek reinstatement in
conjunction with legal relief.33
II. THE STATUTORY QUESTION: MEANING AND INTERPRETATION
A. The Aftermath of Ambiguity
Congress has demonstrated an ability and an inclination to explicitly
provide the right to a jury trial for a federal cause of action when it so
desires. The classic example of an explicit statutory guarantee to a jury
trial in the employment discrimination context, is the 1991 Civil Rights Act
(CRA), which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 34 Section
102 of the CRA amended Title VII to provide for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages in intentional discrimination cases.35
The CRA defined compensatory damages through inclusion and exclusion.
Included in the CRA's definition of "compensatory damages" are "future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses. 36 By contrast,
the CRA excludes, "backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of
relief authorized under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" from the
realm of "compensatory damages. 37  The CRA states that "[i]f a
complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this
section- any party may demand a trial by jury.,
38
33. See, e.g., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471-72 (1962) (holding that a trial
concerning legal claims ensures the right to a trial by jury).
34. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C and 42 U.S.C.).
35. Id. at § 102 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2002)).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3).
37. Id. at § 198la(b)(2).
38. Id. at § 1981a(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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In contrast to the amended Title VII, SOX contains no explicit
statutory right to a jury trial. SOX enables the corporate whistleblower to
bring "an action at law or equity for de novo review" in federal district
court, assuming that the administrative requirement is satisfied.39 It also
contains a remedial provision, providing that a prevailing employee is
entitled to all make-whole relief.40 Make-whole relief includes three
categories of compensatory damages as characterized by Congress:
reinstatement, back pay, and special damages.
In terms of the plain language of the statute, the remedial provision
and the characterization of the action as being available "at law or equity
for de novo review" is the sum of the evidence of Congressional intent.
The absence of a specific guarantee in the plain language of the statute does
not necessarily mean that jury trials are to be denied to SOX plaintiffs.
Ambiguity in the statute does not preclude an interpretation that implies the
right to a jury trial.
Legal academic literature is replete with articles addressing particular
statutory construction methodologies.4' While some articles address
whether one foundational theory of statutory interpretation is better than
another,42 I does not stake any particular claim as to whether one
methodology of statutory construction is preferable to another, or whether
the various methodologies can be neatly separated. However, various
interpretive techniques will be used in addressing whether the right to a
jury trial should be implied. In difficult interpretive puzzles such as this,
the advice from Chief Justice Marshall is particularly apt: "Where the mind
labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing [sic]
from which aid can be derived ....
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2000).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1).
41. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip F. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 (1990) ("[F]oundationalism is a flawed
strategy for theorizing about statutory interpretation and ... a more modest approach,
grounded upon 'practical reason,' is both more natural and more useful."); Stanley Fish,
Editor's Symposium: What is Legal Interpretation? There is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 629 (2005) (arguing that there is no textualist position); John F. Manning,
What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (advocating the
textualist approach to statutory construction); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L.
REV. 347 (2005) (describing the difference between textualism and intentionalism).
42. See supra text accompanying note 41.
43. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S.(2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
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B. Statutory Construction
It is often stated that a statute should be construed so as to avoid
raising serious constitutional questions.44 The SOX language, structure,
legislative history, and purpose plausibly indicate that Congress intended to
grant the right to a jury trial on SOX claims that seek legal-as opposed to
equitable-relief. Judicial adoption of such an interpretation is favored in
order to avoid the thorny constitutional question.45
1. Supreme Court Precedent
The United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to imply a right
to a jury trial when the statute makes no mention of jury trials, or even
juries for that matter. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, the Court refused to construe the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Section 1983 to imply a right to a jury trial.46 The right to a jury
trial was denied merely because the statute authorizes a party who has been
deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief
through "an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress., 47 The phrase "action at law," standing alone, does not necessarily
implicate the right to a jury trial.48
In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, the Court held, consistent
with federal courts of appeals decisions, that § 504(c) of the Copyright Act
cannot be interpreted to imply the right to a jury trial.49  Section 504(c)
permits the recovery of "statutory damages," which the court assesses in a
44. The statutory question should be considered before the constitutional question as it
is a "cardinal principle" that courts must "first ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided." City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345 (1998)); accord Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978). However, the Supreme Court has been willing to forego
extended consideration of the statutory question when two conditions are satisfied: first, the
wording and construction of the statute permit plausible arguments on both sides of the jury
trial issue; and second, the necessity for jury trial is so clearly settled by prior Seventh
Amendment decisions that it would be futile to spend time on the statutory issue. Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192, n.6 (1974).
45. See United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909) ("[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided,
our duty is to adopt the latter."), but see Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 815-17 (1983) (criticizing statute
of construction).
46. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 707.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 707-08.
49. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345.
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just amount." In this context, "court" refers to the judge, not jury.5  The
Court contrasted the remedies provisions of the Copyright Act, which uses
the term "court" in contexts that confer authority on the judge, with §
504(b) of the Act.52 Section 504(b) does not use the word "court" in
addressing awards of actual damages and profits.53 The Court stated that
actual damages and profits are generally thought to constitute legal relief
and intimated that entitlement to a jury trial exists for copyright actions that
seek actual damages.54
In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, the Court considered a
bankruptcy case where a Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee sued various
corporations in order to avoid allegedly fraudulent transfers and to recover
damages.5 The corporations based their claim to a jury trial entirely on the
Seventh Amendment.5 6 The Court agreed with the corporations' position
that the 1982 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1411-a provision for jury trials in
bankruptcy proceedings-did not provide a statutory entitlement to a jury
trial. 7 The Court characterized § 1411 as "notoriously ambiguous" and
noted that the confused legislative history of § 1411 had "puzzled
commentators."5"
In Lorillard v. Pons, the Court implied a statutory right to a jury trial
in a private Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) action for lost
50. In pertinent part, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) provides:
(c) Statutory Damages.-
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner
may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of
actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements
involved in the action, with respect to any one work . . . in a sum of not less
than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just....
(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion
may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than
$150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its
discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than
$200.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2004).
51. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 346.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 492 U.S. 33, 33 (1989).
56. Id. at 40.
57. Id. at 40, n.3.
58. Id.
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wages.5 9 The relevant statutory language authorized individuals to bring
actions for "legal or equitable relief," and "the court ... to grant such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate."60 The Court's decision rested on
two factors. The statute uses the term "legal relief," which the court
determined to be a "term of art."' 1 The Seventh Amendment entitlement to
a jury trial on claims for legal relief is historic and well-known, thus raising
the inference that Congress used the term "legal" with the intent to provide
for a jury trial.62  In addition, the ADEA's remedial provisions were
expressly to be enforced in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (FLSA), which had been uniformly interpreted to provide a right to
a jury trial on unpaid wage claims by private actors.63 As the Court stated,
"where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a
prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of
the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects
the new statute., 64 The Court presumed that Congress intended the FLSA
right to jury trial to apply in the ADEA context.65
2. SOX Statutory Structure, Statutory Language, and Legislative
History
The statutory language in the civil action and remedial provisions
should be interpreted to imply the right to a jury trial. The civil action
provision authorizes a SOX plaintiff to bring an "action at law ... for de
novo review., 66 "[A]ction at law" is synonymous with a jury trial.67 The
term "de novo review" in this statute could be interpreted to mean a de
novo jury trial. The remedial provision authorizes the recovery of
monetary damages as compensation, which constitutes legal relief.6 Legal
relief has traditionally been associated with entitlement to a jury trial.69
59. 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
60. Id. at 579, n.5; 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)-(c) (2000).
61. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 583.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 580-81.
64. Id. at 581.
65. Id.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2000).
67. See infra note 104.
68. See infra note 109.
69. See infra note 104.
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a. The SOX civil action provision
The statute authorizes a SOX plaintiff to bring an "action at law or
equity for de novo review" in federal district court.7 ° Del Monte Dunes
instructs that the use of the phrase "action at law" does not necessarily
imply the right to a jury trial, however the use of the language in SOX
should certainly be considered in determining whether to imply such a
right, since actions at law are synonymous with jury trials. Equity suits are
not tried to juries,7 and it would seem at first blush that "de novo review"
entails a decision by a judge, and not one made by a jury.
It is possible that Congress contemplated that some SOX plaintiffs
would bring a federal action only seeking reinstatement as their only
remedy, however unlikely that would be. In such a scenario, the action
would be in equity because reinstatement is an equitable remedy, and thus
no right to a jury trial attaches.72 However, in the typical SOX action, the
plaintiff will seek reinstatement, back pay, and perhaps damages for
reputational and mental anguish. This typical SOX action would
presumably be at law, because legal relief in the form of monetary damages
is sought.73 Because an action at law seeking monetary damages is the
quintessential jury claim, it would appear as though Congress intended for
these types of claims to be tried by juries.
7 4
The following subparts examine what Congress likely meant by "de
novo review" and whether it can be conducted by a jury. The conclusion is
that Congress intended for juries to hear a trial de novo if a plaintiff brings
a SOX action at law.
i. De novo review means de novo trial
De novo review is a legal term the meaning of which varies with the
circumstances. Literally, de novo means "[a]new; afresh; a second time."75
The use of the term "de novo review" that immediately comes to mind is in
reference to appellate review of a trial court's legal decisions, such as
whether the trial court's jury instructions misstated the law, or whether the
trial court properly granted summary judgment.76 De novo review, in this
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2000).
71. See infra notes 101-02.
72. See infra notes 101, 102, & 116.
73. See infra note 110.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(I)(B) (2000).
75. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).
76. See Wall Data v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 784 (9th Cir.
2006) (reviewing jury instructions de novo to determine whether instructions misstated the
law); accord United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 709 (7th Cir. 2006); Crigger v.
Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Scaife v. Cook County, 446
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context, does not involve the taking of additional evidence; as such, it is not
a trial de novo.
Historically, the term "de novo review" has its origins in equity cases,
where appellate courts tried claims anew."7 In the ancient English chancery
system, de novo review of the chancellor's decision "took the form of a
trial de novo complete with the taking of testimony and other evidence."'7 8
In the United States, review in equity cases gradually moved from a
complete trial de novo to simply an appellate review of the record.7 9
Today, in states with chancery courts, the appeal of an equity case
generally involves the appellate court conducting de novo review of the
factual findings and legal conclusions made by the chancellor, all based on
the record made in the chancery court.8 0 Currently, some level of deference
is given to the chancellor's factual findings because oral testimony is
allowed in equity trials."' Historically, only written testimony was
permitted in equity cases8 2
Notwithstanding the watered-down version of de novo review in
modem-day equity cases, de novo review generally entails at the very least
"an independent determination of the issues." 83 In other words, deference
is not paid to the previous entity that made a particular decision, whether
the entity is a trial court or an administrative agency. It is more difficult to
ascertain whether the "independent determination" is to be based strictly on
the record developed by the prior entity, or whether the entity engaging in
the de novo review can make a determination based on additional evidence
that is generated in the new proceeding. The term de novo review is used
both ways.84
F.3d 735, 738-39 (7th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo, viewing the facts and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party).
77. See Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 78 P.3d 570, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (stating
that the origins of"de novo review" are found in equity cases).
78. Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE
U.L.REv. 11, 16 (1994).
79. Id. at 16-18.
80. See Ark. Presbytery v. Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Ark. 2001) (noting that in
equity cases, the appellate court reviews both law and fact); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d
864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (stating the standard of review to include errors of law and fact).
81. Kunsch, supra note 78, at 17-18. See Ark. Presbytery, 40 S.W.3d at 305 (stating a
finding of fact is not reversed unless the lower court has clearly erred).
82. See Kunsch, supra note 78, at 17-18 (discussing the historical changes in the
allowance of testimony in equity cases).
83. Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1991). See also United States v.
First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967) (finding that de novo review
means the court should make an independent determination of the issues).
84. See 2 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW § 15.02 (3d. ed. 1999) (stating that under the de novo review standard, the court is
authorized to make a judgment based on the agency record or on its own or a new remand
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Under some federal statutes and laws, de novo review does not
involve the taking of additional evidence and is confined to the record
developed below. 5 In other federal statutes, de novo review involves the
reviewing entity considering new or additional evidence, or conducting a
complete trial de novo. 6 For SOX purposes, the question is whether "de
record); see also 5 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 51.04 (rev.
ed. 1985) (stating that court engaged in de novo review is not confined to the administrative
record, but may pursue whatever further inquiry necessary or proper to exercise the court's
independent judgment).
85. See Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990) (confining
reviewing court to administrative record in ERISA benefits denial case, despite standard of
review described as de novo); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)(2000) (providing that the
Federal Magistrates Act, provides for de novo district court review of a magistrate's
recommendations on pretrial motions; however, de novo review is based on the evidentiary
record before the magistrate); accord United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980)
(discussing the Federal Magistrates Act).
86. The Privacy Act provides a civil action in federal district court to any individual
who desires to challenge an agency's determination not to amend the individual's record.
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2004). "In such a case the court shall determine the matter
de novo." Id. (emphasis added). The "de novo" review in the Privacy Act "is not limited to
or constricted by the administrative record." Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 698 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). The Federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA), provides that a reviewing
court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
... unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court." Federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1996)
(emphasis added). The courts have universally interpreted this provision as establishing a
de novo review standard. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the Supreme
Court referred to § 706(2)(F) as providing for de novo review, but confined the de novo
review of agency actions to two circumstances. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). The Court
stated:
De novo review of whether the Secretary's decision was "unwarranted by the
facts" is authorized by § 706(2)(F) in only two circumstances. First, such de
novo review is authorized when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the
agency factfinding procedures are inadequate. And, there may be independent
judicial factfinding when issues that were not before the agency are raised in a
proceeding to enforce non-adjudicatory agency action.
Id. Subsequent cases have revealed that the Overton Park decision makes it difficult to
convince a court that de novo review is authorized under § 706(2)(F). However, it is
understood that de novo review under the APA permits the consideration of extrinsic
evidence outside of the administrative record. This therefore allows the plaintiff to put on
his own case through new testimony and documentary evidence. See Camp v. Pitts, 411
U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (discussing the de novo standard set out in Overton Park); FTC v. U.S.
Roofing Corp., 853 F.2d 458, 461 n.5 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that de novo review allows
the reviewing court to make its own findings of fact); Stewart v. Potts, 126 F. Supp. 2d 428,
434 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (explaining that an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review does
not equate to de novo review); La Plaza Def. League v. Kemp, 742 F. Supp. 792, 799
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing the entry of extrinsic evidence); Cronkhite v. Kemp, 741 F.
Supp. 828, 829-30 (E.D. Wash. 1990) (describing the spectrum of appellate review);
Edward C. Fritz, Broadening Judicial Review Under the National Forest Management Act,
3 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 35 (1996) (explaining the use of trial de novo).
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novo review" means independent fact-finding based solely on what is in the
administrative record, or whether "de novo review" involves a complete
trial de novo in which additional evidence that is generated in the civil
action itself is considered.
"De novo review" in SOX means a full de novo trial, in which the fact
finder makes an independent determination of liability and damages based
on evidence generated and introduced in the federal court case. The SOX
legislative history reveals that the use of the word "review" in the statute is
not intended to signify that the federal court fact finder is limited by any
administrative record. It states that the SOX claimant may bring a "de
novo case in federal court with a jury trial available. The legal definition of
"case" is: "[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at
law or in equity."87 Congress used the term "de novo review" to indicate
that a claimant could bring an entirely new suit in federal court. Nothing in
the statute or the legislative history indicates that this new case must be
limited to the administrative record before the Department of Labor.
Congress did not expressly indicate that de novo review was to be confined
to the administrative record; nor did it use the term "substantial evidence,"
a term of art which is universally understood to mean review limited to the
administrative record.88
Interpreting "de novo review" in SOX as being limited to the
administrative record is illogical because in most SOX actions brought in
federal district court there is little, if any, agency record to review.
Generally, SOX complainants who choose to file suit in district court do so
before the administrative law judge holds an administrative hearing.8 9 In
those situations, the only relevant administrative document that the fact-
finder could possibly "review" is an OSHA preliminary order.90  The
87. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (8th ed. 2004).
88. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 862 n.37 (1976) ("In most instances, of
course, where Congress intends review to be confined to the administrative record, it so
indicates, either expressly or by use of a term like 'substantial evidence,' which has 'become
a term of art to describe the basis on which an administrative record is to be judged by a
reviewing court."') (internal citations omitted).
89. See Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints under Section 806 of
the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 29 C.F.R. § 1980.114(a) (2005) (granting complainants the right to
bring an action for de novo review of their claim in federal district court if the
Administrative Review Board has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the filing of
the complaint).
90. Hanna v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326-1331 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
The OSHA preliminary order cannot become a "final decision," and hence not reviewable in
a de novo case, unless the SOX complainant fails to object to the preliminary order within
30 days of receiving the OSHA findings. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A) (2000) ("If the
Secretary of Labor concludes that there is a reasonable cause to believe that a violation of
subsection (a) has occurred, the Secretary shall accompany the Secretary's findings with a
preliminary order providing the relief prescribed by paragraph (3)(B)."); 29 C.F.R. §
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OSHA investigator's preliminary written findings are based on a brief
initial investigation and only go so far as to state "whether or not there is
reasonable cause to believe that the named person has discriminated against
the complainant in violation of the Act."9' The OSHA preliminary findings
are not made after a trial court-like hearing in which both parties have a fair
opportunity to present their case.9' A trial court-like hearing only occurs
after the preliminary order is appealed to an administrative law judge.93
SOX plaintiffs who sue in federal district court after the 180 day deadline
passes have only received a preliminary finding from OSHA. It is
unjustifiable to conclude that Congress intended for SOX plaintiffs to be
limited to arguing, in their "de novo federal court case", whether the OSHA
investigator correctly determined if a SOX violation occurred. This is
particularly true since the OSHA investigator has only conducted a brief
investigation, without a trial court-like hearing, and the preliminary
''reasonable cause" finding is not even a finding as to whether or not a
violation actually occurred.
Some SOX actions may be brought after a substantial agency record
has been developed. The statute permits complainants to bring an action in
district court for de novo review "[i]f the Board has not issued a final
decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, and there is no
showing that there has been delay due to the bad faith of the
complainant., 94 For example, under the literal language of the statute, if an
administrative law judge decides 300 days after the administrative
complaint is filed that the employer did not violate SOX, the complainant
may then appeal the administrative finding to the Administrative Review
Board (ARB). While the ARB appeal is being conducted, the complainant
is permitted to bring suit in federal district court because there has not been
a "final decision" within 180 days. Similarly, if the complainant fully
litigates the case through the administrative scheme and receives a "final
decision" from the ARB 500 days after the administrative complaint was
filed, the complainant may then bring suit in federal district court because
the "final decision" of the Secretary did not occur within 180 days of the
1980.106(a), (b)(2) (2005) (establishing the possible avenues for judicial review of a
discrimination complaint that has not been subject to full administrative review). If a SOX
plaintiff sues in federal district court within 30 days of receiving the OSHA findings, the
preliminary order should not be a "final decision." If a SOX plaintiff sues in federal district
court more than 30 days after receiving the OSHA findings, presumably he would have
needed to have objected to the findings at the administrative level in order to proceed with
the de novo suit.
91. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.105(a) (2005)
92. Hanna, 348 F. Supp. 2dat 1331.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.107.
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.114(a).
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filing of the administrative complaint. 95 In both of these scenarios, the
federal court fact-finder would have a substantial agency record and
findings to review.
It is uncertain whether courts will interpret the statute to allow SOX
plaintiffs who have already had an administrative proceeding, in the form
of an ALJ hearing, ARB appeal, or both, to bring a de novo case in federal
district court. The Department of Labor's position is that federal courts
should apply collateral estoppel and resjudicata principles if a complainant
brings a SOX action in federal district court following extensive
administrative litigation that has resulted in a decision by an administrative
law judge or the ARB.96  The application of these principles would
preclude those suits on the grounds that Congress did not intend for SOX
plaintiffs to get a second bite at the apple.
The Department of Labor believes it would be "a waste of the
resource of the parties, the Department, and the courts for complainants to
pursue duplicative litigation."9'  This position is understandable on
efficiency grounds. Moreover, allowing a suit in federal district court after
a full and complete administrative adjudication appears at odds with the
appellate judicial review procedures allowed under SOX after a full
administrative adjudication.9 8 However, SOX would not be the first federal
employment discrimination statute to be interpreted to allow complainants
to fully litigate an administrative complaint and subsequently pursue a case
de novo in federal court. For example, federal employees are permitted to
pursue full administrative adjudication of their Title VII discrimination
claims.99 A federal employee who is displeased with the final decision of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Agency may bring a civil action de
novo in federal district court. 100 De novo review for federal employees
95. District Court Jurisdiction of Discrimination Complaints, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,111
(Aug. 24, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1980) ("This statutory structure creates the
possibility that a complainant will have litigated a claim before the agency, will receive a
decision from an administrative law judge, and will then file a complaint in Federal court
while the case is pending review by the Board. The Act might even be interpreted to allow
a complainant to bring an action in Federal court after receiving a final decision from the
Board, if that decision was issued more than 180 days after the filing of the complaint.").
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (2004) (stating that actions brought after a full
administrative adjudication will be governed by the rules of 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)); 49
U.S.C. § 42121 (b)(4)(A) (2000) (indicating that while review is available it must conform to
chapter 7 of Title 5 of the United States Code); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.112(a) (2000) ("Within 60
days after the issuance of a final order by the Board (Secretary) under § 1980.110, any
person adversely affected or aggrieved by the order may file a petition for review of the
order in the United States Court of Appeals ... .
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2000).
100. Id.; See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 (1976) (holding that federal
employees have a right to a trial de novo under Title VII).
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asserting Title VII claims in federal district court involves a trial, not
limited to the evidence from the administrative record, in which there must
be judicial findings concerning liability and remedy based on the evidence
introduced in the federal court case.' °' This is a new trial on both questions
of fact and issues of law conducted as if there had been no administrative
trial in the first instance. 02 If a second bite at the apple is permitted by
SOX, the plain language of the statute and its legislative history indicate
that de novo review entails a de novo trial in which the fact-finder is not
limited to either the administrative record or findings.
ii. De novo review allows for a de novo jury trial
De novo review in SOX means de novo trial-- a new trial of the entire
case in which a fresh, independent determination concerning liability and
remedy is made. This determination is not limited to or constricted by the
administrative record; nor is any deference due the Department of Labor's
conclusions. Therefore, the next question is who, a judge or a jury, must
make this independent determination. While the statute does not explicitly
state whether a jury or a federal judge conducts the de novo review, it is
likely that Congress intended for de novo jury trials.
The primary reason that the statute should be interpreted to allow a
jury to conduct the de novo review is because according to the legislative
history the whistleblower may bring a "de novo case in federal court with a
jury trial available."'0 3 This evidences the Congressional intent. Although
an understandable reaction would be to associate de novo review with
decision-making by a judge, it would be unwise to do so here given that the
statute specifically allows for the SOX action to be brought at law. Actions
at law were typically tried by juries. 1' By contrast, in equity courts, the
101. See Chandler, 425 U.S. at 843-62 (stating a lack of intent by Congress for review of
Title VII claims to be limited to administrative records); Morris v. Rumsfeld, 420 F.3d 287,
292 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a de novo trial under § 2000e-16(c) requires the court to
decide the issues essential to the plaintiffs claims, including liability, without deferring to
any prior administrative adjudication); Scott v. Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, 471-72 (D.C. Cir.
2005) ("Under Title VII, federal employees who secure a final administrative disposition
finding discrimination and ordering relief have a choice: they may either accept the
disposition and its award, or file a civil action, trying de novo both liability and remedy.
They may not, however, seek de novo review of just the remedial award .... "); Timmons v.
White, 314 F.3d 1229, 1232-38 (10th Cir. 2003) (barring a plaintiff who brings a de novo
action under 2000e-16(c) from limiting review to the issue of remedy only; § 2000e-16(c)
action requires independent judicial determination of liability and remedy through a trial de
novo not confined to the administrative record or administrative findings).
102. See Timmons, 314 F.3d at 1233-34 (holding that de novo review involves a
reexamination of all aspects of a claim).
103. 148 CONG. REc. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (emphasis added).
104. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.6(1) (2d ed. 1993) ("Equity courts did not
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chancellor acted as the trier of fact and decision-maker on all issues in an
action in equity-- the equity courts did not grant jury trials.'15 Finally, there
are numerous examples of statutes in which a legislature has provided for a
de novo jury trial. It would not be ground-breaking for Congress to have
intended for a de novo jury trial in SOX litigation. In the civil law context,
Congress provided for a de novo jury trial on the amount of an
administrative penalty issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.106 It has also provided
for a de novo jury trial in civil actions brought by federal employees under
the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which were previously discussed.
°0 7
The jury trial right applies to federal employees who sue in court under §
2000e-16(c) because of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.'
b. The SOX remedial provision
Congress provided for make-whole relief in the SOX statute, which
includes "compensatory damages" and "special damages." A nuanced look
at the statute reveals that "compensatory" and "special" damages include
monetary damages. Monetary damages that compensate a party for his or
her loss are generally viewed as legal relief.'09 Feltner and Lorillard,
grant jury trials; law courts did.").
105. Id. at § 2.6(2) ("The old separate courts of equity did not afford jury trials as of
right. The chancellor acted as trier of fact as well as decision-maker on issues of conscience
or rules.").
106. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742,
757 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§823-959 (2000)); Nat'l Indep. Coal Operators' Ass'n v.
Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 393 (1976).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2000) (citing an employee's right to bring a civil
action on appeal from an agency decision); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (c)(1) (2000) (granting
complainants the right to recover compensatory and punitive damages as well as request a
jury trial); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 221, 227 (1999) (holding jury trial provision in
1981 a(c) applies to complaining party who sues under 2000e- 16(c) and seeks compensatory
damages).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2000).
109. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710-11
(1999) ("The Court has recognized that compensation is a purpose 'traditionally associated
with legal relief."') (quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340,
352 (1998)); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) ("Money damages are, of
course, the classic form of legal relief"); Woodell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71,
502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991) ("Generally, an award of money damages was the traditional form
of relief offered in the courts of law.") (emphasis added); 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.06[1][c] (3d ed. 1997) (if a claim seeks only monetary
damages, the claim will usually be legal and the parties entitled to a jury trial because
monetary damages were the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law); 1 JOHN
N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 237d (5th ed. 1941) ("The award of
mere compensatory damages, which are almost always unliquidated, is a remedy peculiarly
belonging to the province of the law courts, requiring the aid of a jury in their assessment,
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which focus on the Congressional use of "terms of art" that connote legal
relief, instruct the SOX interpretation.
The statute generally provides that the prevailing SOX employee
"shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole." The
reference in § 1514A(c)(1) to "make-whole" relief does not necessarily
clarify whether the relief available is legal, equitable, or both." ° But the
description in § 1514A(c)(2) of reinstatement, back pay, and special
damages as "compensatory damages" gives pause."' Compensatory
damages are traditionally a legal remedy, but the statute is confusing if it
truly means what it says." 2 Back pay could be viewed as compensatory
damages and thus legal relief, as explained in Part III. 1 3 Special damages
in the SOX context, if interpreted to include non-pecuniary damages such
as emotional distress, mental anguish, and reputational damages, are also
appropriately characterized as "compensatory damages."' 14 Such damages
would clearly be legal relief. But reinstatement cannot be characterized as
compensatory damages. The remedy of reinstatement has uniformly been
viewed as injunctive relief and therefore equitable in nature." 5
The answer to this dilemma requires an understanding of the
whistleblower provisions in two federal statutes: the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21 st Century (AIR 21) and the
False Claims Act (FCA). 16  The AIR 21 whistleblower protection
provision prohibits an air carrier from discharging or otherwise
discriminating against any employee because the employee provided
information relating to any violation or alleged violation of any order,
regulation, or standard of the Federal Aviation Administration or any other
provision of Federal law relating to air carrier safety." 7  The FCA
and inappropriate to the judicial functions and position of a chancellor.").
110. Compare Rogers v. Hartford Accident Life & Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir.
1999) (holding "make whole relief' is actually compensatory, i.e., legal, relief not
recoverable under ERISA § 502(a)(3)) with Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 172-73 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding reinstatement, an equitable remedy, advances the policy goals of make-
whole relief and deterrence in a way in which money damages cannot).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2000); see supra note 41 (citing articles addressing
particular methods of statutory construction).
112. See supra note 110 (citing case law defining monetary damages as legal relief).
113. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
114. KOHN, supra note 2, at 108.
115. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211 n.1 (2002)
(referencing a petitioners brief conceding injunction is an inherently equitable remedy);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 n.l 1 (1978) ("judgments compelling 'employment,
reinstatement or promotion' are equitable .... "); DOBBS, supra note 104, at §§ 1.2, 6.10(5)
(explaining how reinstatement is an equitable remedy as it is essentially injunctive relief and
historically the injunction was an equitable remedy).
116. 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
117. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) provides:
Discrimination against airline employees.-No air carrier or contractor or
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whistleblower protection provision protects employees who report their
employers who have submitted fraudulent bills to the United States
Government." 8
The remedial elements of both the AIR 21 and the FCA whistleblower
provisions are crucial to understanding the remedial portion of the SOX
whistleblower provision."1 9  SOX provides that DOL administrative
proceedings will be governed by the "rules and procedures" of AIR 21, 49
U.S.C. § 42121(b). 20  Section 42121(b)(3)(B) details the remedies
subcontractor of an air carrier may discharge an employee or otherwise
discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person
acting pursuant to a request of the employee)-
(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide (with any knowledge
of the employer) or cause to be provided to the employer or Federal
Government information relating to any violation or alleged violation of any
order, regulation, or standard of the Federal Aviation Administration or any
other provision of Federal Law relating to air carrier safety under this subtitle or
any other law of the United States;
(2) has filed, caused to be filed, or is about to file (with any knowledge of the
employer) or cause to be filed a proceeding relating to any violation or alleged
violation of any order, regulation, or standard of the Federal Aviation
Administration or any other provision of Federal law relating to air carrier
safety under this subtitle or any other law of the United States;
(3) testified or is about to testify in such a proceeding; or
(4) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in such a
proceeding.
118. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000). See Neal v. Honeywell, 191 F.3d 827, 829 (7th Cir.
1999) ("The False Claim Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31, penalizes contractors who submit
fraudulent bills to the United States. Private citizens may pursue qui tam actions under the
Act, taking a portion of the recovery as reward (and incentive) for their efforts.").
According to BLACK'S:
"Qui tam" is abbreviation of Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
si ipso in hac parte sequitur" meaning "Who sues on behalf of the King as well
as for himself." It is an action brought by an informer, under a statute [here the
False Claims Act] which establishes a penalty for the commission or omission
of a certain act [here submitting fraudulent bills to the federal government], and
provides that the same shall be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty
to go to any person who will bring such action and the remainder to the state or
some other institution. It is called a "qui tam action" because the plaintiff states
that he sues as well for the state as for himself.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990). In addition to providing the right to file a
qui tam action, the Act also contains a whistleblower-protection provision, which prohibits
retaliation against employees who turn in their employers for violating the Act. 31 U.S.C. §
3730(h) (2000).
119. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(3)(B) (2005); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (2004) ("IN GENERAL. - An action under paragraph
(1)(A) shall be governed under the rules and procedures set forth in section 42121(b) of title
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available to a prevailing AIR 21 complainant by stating that if a violation
occurs, the Secretary of Labor shall order the air carrier to "(i) take
affirmative action to abate the violation, (ii) reinstate the complainant to his
or her position together with compensation (including back pay) and
restore the terms, conditions, and privileges associated with his or her
employment; and (iii) provide compensatory damages to the
complainant."'2 Although compensatory damages are often viewed as
encompassing both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages 22 , the AIR 21
whistleblower statute views "compensatory damages" as primarily non-
pecuniary, separate and apart from pecuniary damages such as back pay.
23
This is not surprising given that the AIR 21 remedial provision was
modeled, to some extent, after other federal whistleblower remedial
provisions, such as the one in the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA). 24 It
is established law that "compensatory damages" are available under the
ERA whistleblower provision and other environmental whistleblower
statutes and that "compensatory damages" under these statutes means non-
pecuniary damages, which include recovery for mental anguish, emotional
distress, pain and suffering, humiliation, and loss of professional
reputation. The law in this area was clear at the time Congress enacted
49, United States Code."). A person who alleges retaliation in violation of SOX may seek
relief by "filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(1)(a) (2000).
121. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(3)(B) (2005) (emphasis added).
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) ("Compensatory damages are
the damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm
sustained by him."). Compensatory damages are divided into two categories: pecuniary
and non-pecuniary. Id. §§ 905-906. Non-pecuniary compensatory damages include
compensation for bodily harm and emotional distress, and are awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss. Id. § 905.
123. See Lawson v. United Airlines, Inc., 2002-AIR-6, at 50 (Dep't of Labor, Dec. 20,
2002) (holding compensatory damages under AIR 21 statute may be awarded for emotional
pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation).
124. See, e.g., Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints under Section
519 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 67
Fed. Reg. 15,454 (Apr. 1, 2002) (interim final rule) (showing that in drafting regulations
governing AIR 21, Assistant Secretary of OSHA gave consideration to the whistleblower
regulations of the ERA, when appropriate).
125. Hobby v. Georgia Power Co., ARB No. 98-166, ALJ No. 1990-ERA-30, electronic
slip op. at 31-35 (ARB Feb. 9, 2001), afid sub. nom. Georgia Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, No. 01-10916 (11 th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (awarding $250,000 in compensatory
damages for emotional distress and damage to professional reputation); Van der Meer v. W.
Kentucky Univ., ARB No. 97-078, ALJ No. 1995-ERA-38 (ARB Apr. 20, 1998) (awarding
$40,000 in compensatory damages for public humiliation); Creekmore v. ABB Power Sys.
Energy Servs., Inc., No. 93-ERA-24 (Dep't of Labor, Feb. 14, 1996) (awarding $40,000 in
compensatory damages for emotional pain and suffering); Trueblood v. Von Roll America,
Inc., 2002-WPC-3 to 6, 2003-WP-1 (Dep't of Labor, Mar. 26, 2003) (awarding $50,000 in
compensatory damages for mental anguish, anxiety, and damage to career aspirations);
Michaud v. BSP Transp., Inc. ARB No. 97-113, ALJ Case No. 95-STA-29 (ARB Oct. 9,
1997).
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SOX in July 2002. 26 Although little administrative case law interpreting
"compensatory damages" under AIR 21 existed at the time SOX was
enacted, there is no reason to believe that "compensatory damages" in AIR
21 means anything different than what it means under the ERA and other
whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA. Indeed, six months after
SOX's enactment, an Administrative Law Judge ruled perfunctorily in an
AIR 21 case that the AIR 21 statute contemplated the possible award of
compensatory damages, which included awards for emotional pain and
suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. 127 Therefore, it
would not be a stretch to conclude that SOX remedies include
compensatory damages, meaning recovery for non-pecuniary loss, in order
to align with AIR 21 and ERA law.
12
The potential counter argument is that for federal court actions, the
SOX whistleblower statute does not explicitly adopt the AIR 21 Rules and
Procedures. 29 Indeed, adoption of the AIR 21 Rules and Procedures would
have been illogical because they are designed to align SOX administrative
proceedings with AIR 21 administrative proceedings on procedural
issues. 3 ° In any event, the statutory reference to the AIR 21 Rules and
Procedures should in no way be interpreted to incorporate AIR 21
remedies. The Rules and Procedures are not remedies, despite the
incorporation of § 42121(b) in it's entirety into the statute. 131 Moreover,
the statute specifically states that the remedies available in SOX
administrative and federal court actions are provided in the remedial
provision. 3 2 If Congress intended to explicitly incorporate the AIR 21
remedies, it could have easily done so; there would have then been no need
for an independent SOX remedial provision. In spite of these arguments,
the legislative history supports the position that courts should imply the
right to ajury trial.
Congress considered compensatory damages as a remedy, separate
126. See supra, note 125.
127. See supra note 125.
128. SOX adopts the AIR 21 requirement that a complaint will be dismissed if it fails to
make a prima facie showing that protected behavior or conduct was a contributing factor in
the unfavorable personnel decision alleged in the complaint. The "contributing factor"
language is identical to language in the employee protection provisions of ERA and AIR 21
and thus should be interpreted pursuant to established interpretations of the phrase under
ERA case law. Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section
806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,104, 52,106-107 (Aug. 24, 2004) (final rule).
129. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514(b)(2) (2000) (stating adverse party in complaint has right to
"present evidence and cross-examine witness").
130. Supra, note 18.
131. AIR 21 remedies are provided in 49 U.S.C. § 4212 1(b)(3)(B) (2000).
132. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514(b)(1),(c) (2000) (stating statutory prohibitions on
harassment of witness or victim).
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and apart from reinstatement and back pay, even though the explicit
statutory language says otherwise. The section-by-section analysis of
section 806 states: "[§ 1514A(c)] governs remedies and provides for the
reinstatement of the whistleblower, back pay, and compensatory damages
to make a victim whole, including reasonable attorney fees and costs, as
remedies if the claimant prevails."' 33  The compensatory damages
referenced do not specifically include damages for mental anguish,
emotional distress, reputational injury, and the like, but the use of the
phrase "to make a victim whole" certainly supports such a statutory
interpretation. 3 4  If Congress viewed compensatory damages, back pay,
and reinstatement as separate remedies, it becomes apparent why Senator
Leahy stated in the legislative history that jury trials are available in SOX
actions.' 35 Congress could rightfully have considered back pay and non-
pecuniary damages, like reputational and mental anguish damages, to be
legal relief in which the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial would
attach."36
An inquiry into the legislative history would be more determinative if
it included more than merely Senator Leahy's statements about jury trial
guarantees and the remedial provision in the section-by-section analysis.
Unfortunately, those two pieces of information appear to be the only clues
in the legislative history; there is nothing else in the legislative history that
would either support or undermine the idea that Congress intended to
133. 148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002); CORPORATE FRAUD
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, Vol. 3,
Doc. No. 85, Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S. REP. No. 107-
146, at 13-14 (William Manz ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003) [hereinafter
CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY] (emphasis added).
134. CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY., supra note 133.
135. See, 148 CONG. REC. S7418, S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (noting that an employee may bring a "de novo case in federal court with a jury trial
available," once administrative proceedings have been exhausted).
136. Culling the legislative history of a statute for signs of intended Congressional
meaning, especially when the legislative history is sparse, is a challenging task. The
interpreter who takes such a route should remind himself of the possible unreliability of
such history and the fact that the exercise is something of a construct because a collective
entity cannot have an "intent." Nelson, supra note 41, at 362. It is nonetheless a useful
exercise in the present case. The SOX statute uses remedial terms of art that are intended to
convey a particular legal meaning. The meaning can be derived from the way in which the
law of remedies tends to define those particular words. However, the interpreter must be
open to evidence that Congress attached a specific meaning to a particular term, especially
when that evidence supports an interpretation that is consistent with remedies law. See e.g.,
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 41, at 356 ("[T]he original expectations of the Congress that
enacted the statute . . . are important in a democracy where the legislature is the primary
source of lawmaking . . . .The most authoritative historical evidence is the legislative
history of the statute, because it is a contemporary record made by the enacting legislators.
In some instances, the legislative history may provide an example or suggest an application
that squarely fits within a subsequent interpretive problem.").
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guarantee the right to a jury trial.
If one accepts the argument that Congress adopted the AIR 21/ERA
interpretation of compensatory damages to include reputational and mental
anguish damages, which the legislative history seems to support, it would
follow that Congress also intended to provide for legal relief.'37 For those
unwilling to accept that reasoning, a more satisfying interpretation is
available through comparing the SOX whistleblower provision to the FCA
whistleblower provision.
It is a well-known principle of statutory construction that when a
federal statute is almost identical to another previously-enacted federal
statute, the judicial interpretation of the language from the initial federal act
is persuasive evidence of the meaning of language in the later statute. This
principle of statutory construction holds even if the later statute makes no
reference to the original statute. 138 This concept is related to the doctrine
that related statutes should be read in pari materia. 1
39
The SOX and FCA whistleblower statutes attack similar evils; both
statutes protect employees from retaliation for reporting fraud by
employers. SOX prohibits retaliation for reporting corporate fraud while
the FCA prohibits retaliation for reporting governmental fraud. It is not
surprising that remedial provisions of both statutes are similar. In fact, they
are almost identical. 140  That Congress appears to have borrowed the
137. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 41, at 355 (noting that textual analysis of a statute
sometimes involves looking "to similar provisions in other statutes, especially those
regulating similar things.").
138. See 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 52.02 (6th
ed. 1984) ("The fact that a federal statute is almost a literal copy of another federal statute is
persuasive evidence of a reenactment of that statute; it is therefore proper to the decision
construing the statutory language of the original statute. It is not necessary for the statutes to
be identical in order for the rule to apply; as an example, cases construing the Railroad
Revitalization & Regulatory Reform Act are relevant to analyze the Federal Motor Carrier
Act.").
139. See id., at § 51.03 (asserting that in determining whether a statute should be read in
pari materia, the guiding principle is that if it is natural and reasonable to think that the
understanding of members of the legislature be influenced by another statute, then a court
called on to construe the act in question should allow itself to be similarly influenced).
140. The FCA remedial provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000), states: "Any employee
who is discharged ... shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole.
Such relief shall include reinstatement with the same seniority status such employee would
have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back
pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination,
including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." The primary difference between
SOX and the FCA is that the FCA provides for double back pay. The SOX legislative
history demonstrates that § 2010, Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002,
as introduced to the Senate on March 12, 2002, contained the double back pay remedy. See
CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 133 (indicating section 806 of SOX tracked
almost exactly the provisions of§ 2010); accord 148 CONG. REC. § 7418 (daily ed. July 26,
2002). Section 806, as enacted, does not contain a double back pay remedy. See 18
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remedial language appearing in the FCA statute and inserted it within SOX
leads to the conclusion that Congress intended FCA whistleblower case law
to govern the remedial terms in the SOX statute, along with the right to a
jury trial.' 41 If that is the case, Congressional intent to provide the
opportunity for SOX plaintiffs to seek legal relief in the form of non-
pecuniary damages and obtain a jury trial is evident.
Both SOX and the FCA allow for the recovery of "compensation for
any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination. Prior to
the passage of SOX, the federal courts of appeals had uniformly interpreted
"special damages" in the FCA with respect to retaliation to include
damages for emotional distress. Emotional distress as special damages was
premised on the grounds that back pay and reinstatement are the usual
consequences under the FCA for retaliation violations, while emotional
distress damages are the unusual consequence of such a violation. Thus,
emotional distress damages are special damages according to the
established common-law meaning of "special damages.' ' 43  Appellate
courts permit the recovery of emotional distress damages on the basis that
emotional distress damages are "special damages" under the FCA despite
the fact that they are not listed in the statute as an example of special
damages.144 The limited case law indicates that FCA retaliation cases have
been tried by juries. a4 Because FCA whistleblower plaintiffs are entitled
to a jury trial, SOX whistleblower plaintiffs should have the same right.
Implying the right to jury trial in SOX actions would also be consistent
with court decisions that have implied the right to a jury trial in other
federal anti-discrimination statutes that provide for lost wages and other
U.S.C.A. § 1514(c)(2)(B). SOX also specifically allows for the recovery of expert witness
fees. Id., at § 1514 (c)(2)(C). The FCA does not specifically list expert witness fees as a
form of special damages. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000). Neither SOX nor the FCA contain a
punitive damages remedy, although punitive damages were a part of the SOX remedial
structure in S.2010, as introduced. CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 133, at
10-11.
141. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 537 (1947) ("Words of art bring their art with them. They bear the meaning of
their habitat . . . . And if a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source,
whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.") (emphasis
added).
142. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (c)(2)(C) (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
143. See Hammond v. Northland Counseling Ctr., Inc., 218 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir.
2000) (asserting allegations sufficient to create a material issue of fact regarding entitlement
to damages for emotional distress); Neal v. Honeywell, 191 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir. 1999)
(establishing connection between award for emotional damages and evidence).
144. See, e.g., Hammond, 218 F.3d 886; Neal, 191 F.3d 827.
145. See Neal, 191 F.3d at 829 ("A jury agreed with her accusations..."); Wilkins v. St.
Louis Housing Auth., 198 F.Supp. 2d 1080, 1082-85 (E.D.Mo. 2001) ("This matter is before
the court, following a jury trial ... ").
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damages. 146
Judge Posner advocates the utilization of the "imaginative
reconstruction" perspective. 147 Imaginative reconstruction is an interpretive
technique that requires a judge to "think his way as best he can into the
minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted
the statute applied to case at bar. 148  It is typically associated with
intentionalists; however, not all commentators believe that textualists
repudiate the concept. 49  Professor Nelson argues that textualists use
imaginative reconstruction when deciding severability of a statute, how to
conform a statute to a dubious precedent which the court is not prepared to
overrule, in criticizing the use of imaginative reconstruction in particular
cases, and interpreting certain ambiguous statutes. 150 While commentators
may disagree as to the propriety of the technique, I believe it aids in
deducing this interpretive puzzle.' 5
In addition to the typical items that have already been surveyed, the
imaginative reconstructionist looks at the values and attitudes of the period
in which the legislation was enacted, along with considerations drawn from
a broadly based conception of the public interest.'52  The SOX
whistleblower statute was enacted in the wake of corporate scandals such
as Enron and WorldCom that ultimately left investors and pensioners
penniless. Congress chose to provide a judicial, and not merely
administrative, remedy to future discharged corporate whistleblowers. The
public has a stake in holding corporations accountable when
whistleblowers are penalized for reporting corporate fraud because the
public wants to preempt a replay of scandals like Enron. Against that
background, it is likely that Congress would have intended the public to
have a role in making findings concerning corporations who punish
whistleblowers. 153 As a cross-section of the community representing the
146. See Frizzell v. Sw. Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 642-44 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding
that jury right implied in FMLA).
147. Posner, supra note 45, at 817.
148. Id.
149. Nelson, supra note 41, at 403-04.
150. Id. at 403-13.
151. The seminal example of imaginative reconstruction is Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1946).
Judge Hand used imaginative reconstruction to decide whether a veteran's reemployment
right provided in a federal statute should be construed narrowly or broadly based in part on
the public circumstances at the time of the enactment. Id. at 788-89. Judge Hand used
imaginative reconstruction because the statutory language was ambiguous. I advocate
imaginative reconstruction because the statutory language in SOX is similarly befuddling.
152. Posner, supra note 45, at 818-20.
153. See, e.g., Fishgold, 154 F.2d at 788-89 ("Against that background [situation in
September 1940 as to whether the United States would send troops overseas to war] it is not
likely that a proposal would then have been accepted which gave industrial priority,
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general public, the jury is the logical choice to serve as the conduit of the
public interest in this area of public concern.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: SOX AND THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT
If the federal courts decline to imply the right to a jury trial from the
SOX whistleblower statute, they must grapple with the constitutional
question of whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury
trial for SOX cases brought in federal court. According to Supreme Court
precedent, the answer turns on whether the nature of the SOX action is best
viewed as an action at law or in equity, and whether the nature of the relief
provided by the statute is legal or equitable. The vast majority of
practitioners, scholars, and judges lack a detailed knowledge of the
historical divide between law and equity. Delaware is an example of a
jurisdiction that maintains the historical distinction between law and equity,
but it is the exception to the rule. 5 4  Most attorneys operate in civil
procedure systems that have merged law and equity entirely. The federal
civil procedure system, of course, is the prime example. The adoption of
the Rules Enabling Act in 1934 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 in
1938, completed the merger of law and equity in the federal system.'55
Although "memories of the divided bench" have faded, 56 the distinction
between law and equity is of considerable practical importance in
determining whether the right to a jury trial exists on a statutory cause of
action that does not expressly or impliedly grant a right to jury trial.'57
The jury trial clause of the Seventh Amendment states: "In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
regardless of their length of employment, to unmarried men-for the most part under
thirty-over men in the thirties, forties, or fifties, who had wives and children dependent
upon them.").
154. See Weston Invs. v. Domtar Indus., Inc., No. 99C-06-041-FSS, 2002 WL
31011141, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2002) ("Delaware proudly guards the historic and
important distinction between legal and equitable jurisdiction.").
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure .. "); FED.R.Civ.P. 2 ("There shall be one form of
action to be known as 'civil action."'). The creation of one form of action-the "civil
action"-merged the systems of law and equity and eliminated the practice of having a "law
side" and an "equity side," with each "side" having its own particular rules and procedures.
See I JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.02[2][a] (3d ed. 1997)
(noting the "'merger of the systems of law and equity."').
156. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1998) (recognizing that "memories
of the divided bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into the
past.")
157. See MOORE, supra note 155, at § 2.06[1 ][a] (explaining that the jury trial right exists
for legal issues but not equitable or admiralty issues).
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the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.' ' 58 The Supreme Court has
stated that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial covers more than
traditional common law actions that existed in 1791. 5 9 The right also
applies to newly-enacted federal statutes that create legal rights and
remedies.160 An early Supreme Court case, Parsons v. Bedford, interpreted
the Framers' use of the term "common law" to include all suits in which
"legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies
were administered."' 16' The Parsons court presumed the Amendment to
embrace all suits "which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal
rights.' ' 162  More recently, the Court stated that the applicability of the
constitutional right to jury trial in actions enforcing statutory rights is "a
matter too obvious to be doubted" if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies which are enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary
courts of law. 163
Nonetheless, Congress maintains the power "to take some causes of
action outside the scope of the Seventh Amendment by providing for their
enforcement through a statutory proceeding or in a specialized court. ' 64
For example, in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Board
ordered the steel company to reinstate employees and pay back wages for
engaging in unfair labor practices. 65  The company argued that it was
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, instead of a Board determination,
because the lost wages award was equivalent to a monetary judgment.
166
The Court labeled the suit a "statutory proceeding" and, as such, not
subject to the Seventh Amendment requirements. 167  Subsequent cases,
refining Jones & Laughlin revealed that the Seventh Amendment is not
applicable to administrative proceedings, at least when so-called "public
rights" are concerned, due to the incompatibility between administrative
adjudication and jury trials. 168 Similarly, the Seventh Amendment is not
158. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
159. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2302.2 (2d ed. 1994).
160. See MOORE, supra note 155, at § 2.06[ 1 ][b] (asserting right to jury can be extended
to claims derived from statutes).
161. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (emphasis in original).
162. Id.
163. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (quoting Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d
1110, 1114 (7thCir. 1972)).
164. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2302.2.
165. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
166. Id. at 48.
167. Id.
168. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418, n.4 (1987) ("[T]he Seventh
Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings."); Atlas Roofing Co. v.
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implicated when Congress limits enforcement of statutory rights to
specialized non-Article III courts, such as bankruptcy courts.
169
Under current Supreme Court case law, the SOX whistleblowers that
remain in the SOX administrative scheme and do not opt out to federal
court are not protected by the Seventh Amendment. An Administrative
Law Judge will hear those cases; no jury will be involved at the
administrative level. However, the Seventh Amendment right is implicated
for the SOX whistleblowers that leave the administrative process for
potentially better options in federal court. For those whistleblowers, the
existence of the right to a jury trial depends on whether the SOX action
resolves legal rights. 70 This entails a two-part analysis known as the
"historical test." One must first compare the SOX action to eighteenth
century actions brought in the courts of law and equity in England to
determine whether it is more analogous to legal forms of action existing at
that time, or to equitable forms. Next, one must examine the nature of the
relief sought, and the remedies, to determine whether the relief is more
appropriately viewed as legal or equitable.' 7' Due to the inherent
difficulties in divining a precise historical analogue, the second part of the
test is generally viewed as the most important.7 2 If the SOX action is an
action at law, one must also consider which particular issues in the case
must be tried by a jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-
law right as it existed in 1791."'
A. The Historical Approach
The historical test traces its roots back to Justice Story's 1812 circuit
opinion in United States v. Wonson. 74 In Wonson, Justice Story held that
in order to determine which civil cases the Seventh Amendment jury right
applies to, courts must look to the English common law. 75 Justice Story
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460-61 (1977) ("[T]he
Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism
for factfinding .. "); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) ("[T]he Seventh
Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings ... ").
169. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337 (1966) (regarding bankruptcy, "there is no
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial for determination of objections to claims"); but see
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64 (1989) (asserting that fraudulent
conveyance action in bankruptcy court is subject to Seventh Amendment right to jury trial).
170. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565
(1990).
171. Id.; MOoRE, supra note 155, at § 2.06[1][c].
172. Tull, 481 U.S. at 421 (1987); MoopE, supra note 155, at § 2.06[l][c] n. 12
(collecting cases).
173. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 718 (1999).
174. 128 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
175. Id. at 750 ("Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to . .. is the
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later expounded in Parsons v. Bedford that "suits at common law" referred
to "suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in
contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized...
,,176 These two cases served as the foundation for the traditional Seventh
Amendment analysis employed by the Supreme Court.17 7
Various commentators have criticized the traditional Seventh
Amendment approach. Charles Wolfram, a leading Seventh Amendment
scholar, argues that the historical materials do not support the historical
test's allegiance to the English common law and concludes that the
historical test is inconsistent with the "traditions of principled
constitutionalism that have guided the Supreme Court in the interpretation
of other commands of the Bill of Rights."'78  Kenneth Klein labels the
historical test a "two hundred year old myth" and analogized the historical
test to the parable of the emperor's new clothes. 79 Klein claims that no
historical materials support the view that the Seventh Amendment's
reference to common law referred to English common law.18° Akhil Reed
Amar opines that the Supreme Court's historical test is not the best reading
of the amendment.181 Stanton Krauss bluntly states that the Supreme
Court's understanding of the Seventh Amendment is based on nineteenth
century revisionist history.18 2  He concludes that Justice Story's
interpretation of the jury trial clause in Wonson and Parsons was not based
on the clause's text and history, but on the result that Story preferred. 83
Each of these commentators-Wolfram, Klein, Amar, and Krauss-
common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be
necessary for me to expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to
every person acquainted with the history of the law.").
176. 28 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1830) (emphasis in original).
177. See, e.g., Rachael E. Schwartz, "Everything Depends on How You Draw the
Lines": An Alternative Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 599, 600-02 (1996) (discussing the origin of the Seventh Amendment analysis).
178. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REv. 639, 731 (1973).
179. Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1005 (1992).
180. Id. at 1022 ("There is no recorded legislative history suggesting that the phrase
'common law' referred to the common law of England. Nor is support found in the records
of the state debates, the Federalist Papers, or the writings of commentators of the time.")
(emphasis in original).
181. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, 89-90
(1998).
182. Stanton D. Krauss, Commentary on Akhil Reed Amar's the Bill of Rights: Creation
and Reconstruction The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 407, 475 (1999) ("Whatever its precise scope, the interpretation
of the Jury Trial Clause that Justice Story propounded in Parsons, which he claimed to
reflect the original understanding of its Creators, was pure ipse dixit. Worse yet, it seems
clearly to have been wrong.").
183. Id. at 478.
SOX WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS AND JURY TRIALS
suggest various alternative approaches to the Seventh Amendment." 4
In spite of the criticism, the historical test's vitality has remained
relatively constant over the last one hundred plus years and it appears
unlikely that the test will be abandoned altogether by the Court.'85
Therefore, the remainder of the article focuses primarily on whether the
Seventh Amendment guarantees the jury trial right on SOX actions under
the historical test. My application of the SOX remedial scheme to the
historical test shows that the Seventh Amendment does guarantee a jury
trial in certain SOX actions. Furthermore, when the jury right attaches, the
jury's primary role is making the factual determination as to whether the
plaintiff has proven the elements of a SOX action and assessing damages.
However, in light of the academic commentary criticizing the historical
test, this part also applies the SOX action to various alternative approaches
of the Seventh Amendment. The article ends by elaborating on the
importance of the jury right in SOX actions.
184. See infra Part III.B.2.
185. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the historical test in a regulatory takings claim brought under Section 1983. 526
U.S. 687 (1999). In deciding the Seventh Amendment question, the Court looked at
whether the claims brought under Section 1983 were analogous to common law claims that
provided legal relief. Id. at 708-11. The majority held that the § 1983 suit in question
sought legal relief and therefore constituted an action at law within the meaning of the
Seventh Amendment. Id. at 709-11. The majority then considered whether particular issues
in the § 1983 suit were proper for determination by the jury under the Seventh Amendment.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that history dictated whether particular
issues in actions at law had to be tried by a jury, but noted that "[wjhere history does not
provide a clear answer, we look to precedent and functional considerations." Id. at 718.
The "functional consideration" in Del Monte Dunes was whether the issues in question were
predominantly factual. Because the issue in the § 1983 action at law was predominantly a
factual one, and factual issues are usually allocated to juries, the Court determined that the
issue in question should go to the jury. Id. at 719-721. Although somewhat hazy, Del
Monte Dunes indicates that "functional considerations" might in some circumstances be a
part of the Seventh Amendment analysis. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., a patent
case, could also be interpreted to stand for the proposition that function and process
considerations play some part in a Seventh Amendment analysis, although Markman seems
to view "functional considerations" differently than Del Monte Dunes. 517 U.S. 370
(1996). Regardless, at least one commentator opines that neither Markman nor Del Monte
Dunes suggest any "radical change" to the traditional Seventh Amendment historical test.
Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh
Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 256 (2000). To the extent that the
Supreme Court is open to expanding its Seventh Amendment analysis to include functional
considerations, however the Court defines that term, it is unforeseeable that the Court
intends to do away with the traditional approach altogether.
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1. Nature of the Right
The first step in the historical test is to compare the SOX claim to
historical legal forms of action and complaints in equity available in
England circa 1791 in order to determine whether it is more analogous to
legal forms of action existing at that time or to complaints appropriate at
equity. 8 6 The answer to the first part of the test is not self-evident, in large
measure because a SOX action could encompass both legal and equitable
issues. 8 7 Indeed, Congress specifically provided for a complainant to bring
the action at law or equity.'88 But in broad terms a SOX action is best
characterized as an action at law.
A SOX whistleblower claim provides a remedy to an employee of a
publicly-traded company who reports corporate fraud, either externally or
internally, and suffers an adverse employment action because of the
report. 8 9 Such an action has no exact counterpart in eighteenth century
England. Indeed, there were relatively few publicly-traded companies in
eighteenth century England.' 90 The few such companies that existed were
strongly tied to the English government and were substantially different
from modem publicly-traded companies.'91 Although no exact counterpart
exists, English common law courts heard breach of contract, tort, and qui
tam claims. A SOX whistleblower claim is essentially a specialized
wrongful termination suit analogous to a breach of contract, tort, or qui tam
claim that would likely have been brought in an English common law court
and tried to a jury in the late 1700's.
The modem American employment at-will rule did not carry the day
in eighteenth century England. 92 The English rule presumed annual, fixed-
186. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
187. Id. at 570 ("[Employees'] action against the Union [for breach of duty of fair
representation] thus encompasses both equitable and legal issues. The first part of our
Seventh Amendment inguiry, then, leaves us in equipoise as to whether [employees] are
entitled to a jury trial.")
188. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2000).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)-(b).
190. Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence:
Evidence from 18th Century England 6 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch. Law and Econ. Working
Papers Series, Paper No. 24, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/art24.
191. Id. at 27-28.
192. See Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998)
("For well over a century, the general rule ... in most American jurisdictions, has been that
absent a specific agreement to the contrary, employment may be terminated by the employer
or the employee at will, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all."). The at-will rule did
not appear as a staple of American employment law until the late nineteenth or early
twentieth century and appears to have been spurred by Horace Wood's 1877 treatise on
master servant relations, which provided:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
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term employment.'93 The English rule, as expounded by William
Blackstone 94, had its origins in feudal-era laws, such as the Statute of
Labourers, which were designed to deal with labor shortages and deadly
epidemics such as the plague.' 95 The Statute of Labourers prohibited a
servant from leaving employment before the end of a term, but also
prohibited the master from discharging the servant before the end of a term
absent reasonable cause.' 96 Although the Statute of Labourers was later
repealed, the presumption in favor of annual term employment with job
protection for servants remained a part of English law throughout the
eighteenth century.' 97 Wrongful discharge claims brought by English
servants circa 1791 were viewed as common-law breach of contract actions
and tried by juries in common-law courts such as the King's Bench and
Common Pleas.' Because an improper employment discharge in
is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or
year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring and no presumption
attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time
the party may serve.
H. G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877).
193. Timothy J. Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management
Considerations, 48 MO. L. REV. 855, 859 (1983) ("In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the English rule provided that unless expressed to the contrary, a term of
employment was presumed to be for one year."). See The King v. Inhabitants of
Hampreston,(1793) 5 T.R. 205, 207, 101 Eng. Rep. 116, 117 (K.B.) (unless otherwise
specified, "hiring must be understood to be a hiring for a year.").
194. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,1 COMMENTARIES *413.
If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes it
to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall
serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the
respective seasons; as well when there is work to be done, as when there is not:
but the contract may be made for any larger or smaller term
195. RICHARD CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW 651 (2005).
196. See Statute of Labourers,1349, 23 Edw. 3, c. I (Eng.) (requiring that employment be
for terms of years); Statute of Labourers, 1562 5 Eliz. 1, c.4 (Eng.) (repealing and
recodifying English employment laws); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 120 (1976); Heinsz, supra note 193, at
859.
197. See Heinsz supra note 193, at 859 ("In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
English rule provided that unless expressed to the contrary, a term of employment was
presumed to be for one year."); 25 EARL OF HALSBURY, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
480-81 (3d ed. 1958) ("If a contract of hiring and service is ... without limitation of time,
there is a presumption that the hiring is for a year .... ).
198. See Lebow v. Am. Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Employment
by contract was the rule in eighteenth-century England, so an improper discharge would
have been viewed as a [common-law] breach of contract."); accord Stonehill Coll. v. Mass.
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 214 n.15 (Mass. 2004); Magnan v.
Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781, 783 (Conn. 1984). See also E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS, §§ 1.5, 11.2 (2d ed. 1990) (breach of contract actions were typically tried at
common law in eighteenth-century England). Examples of wrongful discharge cases heard
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eighteenth century England would have been viewed as a breach of
contract claim remediable by the English common law, a SOX
whistleblower action, which at its core is a wrongful discharge claim for
implied breach of contract, is analogous to a common-law breach of
employment contract claim and thus an action at law in which the right to
jury trial is preserved by the Seventh Amendment.'99
Another apt analogy is to tort law. Curtis v. Loether and Del Monte
Dunes affirm the general principle that a federal statutory claim that allows
for monetary damages upon the violation of an imposed legal duty-just
like SOX-sounds in tort, and thus a plaintiff asserting such a claim is
entitled to a jury trial.2°° Curtis concerned a suit for violations of the fair
housing provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, a race
discrimination statute. 20 ' Del Monte Dunes involved a § 1983 action for
deprivation of property 2 . In both cases, the Court explained why the
statutory causes of action were best characterized as tort claims and
clarified that a tort action seeking monetary damages, although provided
for by statute and not by the common law, is generally a "suit at common
law" for which the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial.20 3
The Curtis Court stated that a Title VIII damages action sounds in tort
because "the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the
courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's
wrongful breach. ' '204 In Del Monte Dunes, the Court concluded that a §
1983 action fit within both the historical and modern definition of a tort
claim in that "torts are remedies for invasions of certain rights, such as the
rights to personal security, personal liberty, and property" and are
"designed to provide compensation for injuries arising from the violation of
by English juries in common-law courts include Fawcett v. Cash, (1834) 110 Eng. Rep.
1026 (K.B.) and Beeston v. Collyer, (1827) 4 Bing. 309, 130 Eng. Rep. 786 (C.P.).
199. See, e.g., Lebow, 86 F.3d at 669 (wrongful discharge claim for engaging in union
activities under Railway Labor Act analogous to common-law breach of contract action);
Waldrop v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 156 (11 th Cir. 1994) (unlawful discharge claim
under Rehabilitation Act analogous to common-law breach of contract action); Hill v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1 lthCir. 1991) (constructive discharge claim
under Jury System Improvements Act analogous to common-law breach of contract action);
Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991)
(unlawful discharge claim under Rehabilitation Act is closely analogous to breach of
express or implied employment contract claim); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Corp.,
550 F.2d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1977) (ADEA suit for back wages is essentially a "routine
contract action" in which the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial).
200. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
201. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 189-90.
202. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 693-94.
203. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-98; Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 707-33.
204. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195.
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legal duties."2 °5  Both Courts indicated that a statutory tort action for
monetary damages is an action for which the jury right attaches because
tort claims for monetary damages were triable to juries at common law.
0 6
Other Supreme Court and federal appellate court cases also reflect this
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. °7 Because SOX essentially
defines a new legal duty, that publicly-traded companies cannot legally fire
employees who report covered corporate fraud-and provides monetary
compensation for injury caused by such a violation. As a result, a SOX
plaintiff is entitled to back pay and special damages upon proof of a
violation, a SOX action sounds in tort and the jury-trial entitlement applies.
The final analogy to qui tam actions available in eighteenth century-
England, has instinctive appeal. During that time, the King's Bench, an
English common law court, had jurisdiction over common law writs of
debt.208 Some of these writs of debt concerned qui tam actions-statutory
causes of action by informers to recover statutorily imposed penalties.20 9
English law had a statute similar to the False Claims Act, that allowed an
informer to recover penalties on behalf of himself and the King for spotting
and reporting an illegal activity.210 Such claims were tried at common law,
presumably to juries.2"' Analogizing SOX actions to these qui tam actions,
which were brought as writs of debt at common law, is well-founded.
English qui tam actions compensated informers for reporting illegal
activity.2! 12 The SOX action protects the jobs of employees who report
illegal activity and ultimately provides make-whole relief to those who
suffer an adverse employment action resulting from their report. 3
The qui tam action tried in the King's Bench courts is the clearest
205. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-96 n.10; Del Montes Dunes, 526 U.S. at 715-19 (plurality
opinion), 727-731 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370 (1974) ("This Court has long
assumed that ... actions for damages to a person or property, are actions at law triable to a
jury"); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970) ("The Seventh Amendment... entitled
the parties to a jury trial in actions for damages to a person or property .... "); Lebow v.
Am. Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 1996) (unlawful discharge suit under
Railway Labor Act is comparable to common-law tort action); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of
Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 829 (4th Cir. 1994) (Rehabilitation Act is essentially a form of statutory
tort).
208. Douglas King, Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 581,598-99 (1984).
209. Id. at 599.
210. Id.
211. Examples of qui tam cases heard by the King's Bench include Shipman v. Henbest,
(1790) 4 T.R. 109, 100 Eng. Rep. 921 (K.B) (illicit sale of leather) and Brooke v. Milliken,
(1789) 3 T.R. 509, 100 Eng. Rep. 705 (K.B.) (illicit sale of imported reprints of books
originally written and published in the United Kingdom). KING, supra note 208, at n. 100.
212. King, supra note 208, at 599.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(2000).
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eighteenth-century analogue to the modem-day SOX action. However,
there is also historical evidence supporting the view that the modem-day
SOX action is closely comparable to common-law breach of contract and
tort actions, which were primarily tried to juries. In any event, each one of
these close analogies supports the contention that the Seventh Amendment
preserves the right to jury trial on SOX whistleblower claims.
2. The Nature of the Remedy
The second piece of the historical test focuses on the nature of the
relief sought.2 14 One must determine whether the SOX relief sought is legal
or equitable in nature. In addition, one must consider whether at the time
of the divided bench, the SOX remedies would have generally been sought
in the courts of law or in the courts of equity. 2 5  To make such a
determination, it is necessary to list the possible available remedies in a
SOX action. The SOX remedial scheme is designed to "make whole" the
prevailing corporate whistleblower. 16  "Make whole" relief includes
reinstatement, back pay, special damages.2 17
Historical and conceptual evidence demonstrate that, while
reinstatement is an equitable remedy, back pay and special damages are
legal remedies. Thus, in a SOX case in federal court where the plaintiff
sues for reinstatement, back pay and special damages, the Seventh
Amendment guarantees a jury trial because the plaintiff has asserted claims
to legal remedies, back pay and special damages, even though an equitable
remedy-reinstatement-is also asserted. That the right to equitable relief
in the form of reinstatement is claimed does not vitiate the application of
the jury right. In Dairy Queen v. Wood, the Court ruled that when two
remedies are requested, one legal and one equitable, a jury trial is required
so long as the right to the remedies turns on common issues of fact 21" The
Court embraced the concept of a constitutionally-required jury trial on all
factual issues presented by claims for legal relief, even if those issues also
concerned claims for equitable relief, and the equitable relief dominates the
legal relief.219  The analysis below elaborates and clarifies why SOX
214. See supra note 171.
215. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-418 (1987) (citations omitted).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1) ("An employee prevailing in [a SOX action] shall be
entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole."); KOHN, supra note 2, at 102
("The heart of a SOX damage award is a 'make whole' remedy.... Under the SOX, the
,make whole' remedy authorizes a court to award all relief necessary to make an employee
'whole."').
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2); KOHN, supra note 2, at 102.
218. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §
6.10(5) at 225 (2d ed. 1993).
219. " '[O]nly under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of
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reinstatement is an equitable remedy, why SOX back pay and special
damages are legal remedies, and why the Seventh Amendment guarantees a
jury trial in SOX whistleblower actions that seek back pay and special
damages.
a. SOX reinstatement
Little time need be spent on the question of the reinstatement remedy
as it has already been alluded to in Part II.B. Professor Dobbs perfunctorily
noted that reinstatement is "essentially injunctive relief."22 Indeed, SOX
suits in federal court to enforce preliminary reinstatement orders by the
Department of Labor have been brought as suits for injunctive relief.2 ' It
is indisputable that the injunction is the quintessential equitable remedy
from an historical standpoint. Moreover, according to the Supreme
Court it is "clear that judgments compelling employment, reinstatement, or
promotion are equitable., 223  Accordingly, the nature of the SOX
reinstatement remedy is best characterized as an equitable one that
historically was available in courts of equity.
b. SOXbackpay
The characterization of monetary remedies for Seventh Amendment
purposes and for determining statutory authorization of relief has
confounded the Supreme Court, federal courts, and commentators for many
years.2  In particular, the characterization of the back pay remedy has
proven to confuse too many courts in too many contexts. 25 In the SOX
context, the back pay remedy is simply a part of monetary compensation,
i.e., a damages award, and thus fits the nature of legal relief.
226
SOX back pay is a substantial part of the SOX "make whole" remedial
the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.' That holding,
of course, applies whether the trial judge chooses to characterize the legal issues presented
as 'incidental' to equitable issues or not." Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962) (internal
citations omitted).
220. 2 DOBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.10(5) at 226 (2d. ed. 1993).
221. Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., Inc., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10926, 24 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 641 (2d Cir. 2006); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D.
Va. 2006).
222. KOHN, supra note 2.
223. Id.
224. Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. Rv. 1577,
1607-28 (2002).
225. Id. at 1628-35.
226. See supra note 109.
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scheme. 27 Its purpose is to restore the whistleblower to the same position
he would have been in but for the illegal discharge or other illegal adverse
employment action.22 8 It is measured by the difference between the actual
earnings the whistleblower made from the time he first lost wages due to
the illegal discharge, to the date of judgment and those he would have
earned absent the illegal discharge.229 Stated differently, a SOX back pay
award should include all of the compensation the whistleblower would
have received but for the illegal firing-lost wages, raises, overtime
compensation, bonuses, vacation pay, and retirement benefits.23 ° SOX back
pay truly is compensation in the form of damages and is ultimately
reflected in a monetary judgment.
Back pay did not exist as a common-law remedy.23' Yet it has become
a standard remedy in many employment discrimination and whistleblower
statutes.232  Indeed, it is remedially similar to a contract claim for past
wages due that would have been brought in a law court. 233  Most
significantly, SOX back pay is a form of compensatory damages because
the award is measured by the whistleblower 's loss as opposed to the
234employer's gain. Any remedy, like back pay, that enables a person to
227. See KOHN, supra note 2 at 106 (noting that "reinstatement and back pay are usually
the two most significant elements of a [SOX] 'make whole' remedy").
228. Id. at 105, (quoting the basic black letter law concerning the calculation of
whistleblower back pay from Hobby v. Georgia Power Co., ALJ No. 1990-ERA-30,
Recommended Decision and Order of ALJ, at 57 (internal citations omitted)).
229. Id. at 106. See, e.g., ABIGAIL MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW §
12.09 at 28 (3d ed. 1993) (stating that "The backpay period normally covers the entire
period during which plaintiff was precluded from performing his or her job by the
employer's wrongful employment action, excluding periods during which plaintiff would
not have been earning wages.")
230. Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1333 (6th Cir. 1988); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1562 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); RICHARD
CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW 992 (2005).
231. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937); Millsap v.
McDonnel Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2004).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2000) (noting that upon a Title VII violation, the
court may "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay .... or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."); 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)(A) (2000)
(stating that under the Whistleblower Protection Act, a federal employee who is entitled to
corrective action under the WPA is to be "placed, as nearly as possible, in the position the
individual would have been in had the prohibited personnel practice not occurred." The
individual is also entitled to "back pay and related benefits.").
233. Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 964 (10th Cir. 2002); 2
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.10(5) at 226 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that "Back pay claims do
not differ remedially from the personal injury claim for lost wages, or the contract claim for
past wages due"); 2 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, §
9.46 at 363-65 (4thed. 1998).
234. See Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1253 (stating that "[b]ackpay is compensatory because the
award is measured by an employee's loss rather than an employer's gain."); 2 DOBBS, LAW
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receive compensatory damages is a legal remedy.235
A SOX back pay claim cannot fairly be categorized as restitutionary
and thus equitable because it neither aims to prevent an employer's unjust
enrichment nor does it restore "in kind" a specific thing to the
whistleblower.236 Undoubtedly some courts in employment discrimination
suits have mistakenly labeled back pay as restitutionary, simply because the
purpose of back pay is to restore the plaintiff to their original position but
for the wrongful employment decision.237 However, as many restitution
scholars and courts have noted, that sort of an understanding of restitution
is wrong because it destroys any conceptual distinction between
compensatory damages and restitution.238 Moreover, even if a restitution
OF REMEDIES § 6.10(5) at 227 n.15 (2d ed. 1993) (asserting that "[b]ack pay might be
considered restitutionary if it were measured by the defendant's gain rather than the
plaintiff's loss, that is, if it were aimed at preventing unjust enrichment. But that is not the
case; it is aimed at compensation and measured by the plaintiffs loss."); Strayer supra note
32, at 825 (noting that "[w]ith back pay, employees receive compensation for wages they
would have earned if they had been employed and also fringe benefits .... Back pay is not
wrongfully withheld wages; rather, it is damages for an employer's breach of a duty it owed
to an employee.").
235. See supra note 109; Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, 24 F.3d 152, 158 (11 th Cir.
2004) (positing that "it has long been the general rule that back wages are legal relief in the
nature of compensatory damages."); 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5) at 226 (2d. ed.
1993) (noting that back pay is an ordinary damages claim, close to an exemplar of a claim at
law); I DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1-1.2 at 3, 11 (2d. ed. 1993) (asserting that "[t]he
damages remedy is a money remedy aimed at making good the plaintiffs losses .... The
damages remedy was historically a legal remedy."); 1 ARTHUR G. SEDGWICK & JOSEPH H.
BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, § 3 at 3 (1920) (stating that "equity...
gives specific relief by decreeing the very thing to be done which was agreed to be done...
But, as a general rule, it refrains from awarding pecuniary reparation for damage
sustained."); Murphy supra note 224, at 1633 (noting that "[t]he backpay remedy is more
appropriately characterized as damages for the plaintiffs losses and thus legal relief.").
236. "Restitution" is generally viewed as recovery based on and measured by a
defendant's unjust enrichment. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § I comments a, d (1937); 1
GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.10 at 140 (1978); 1 DOBBS LAW OF
REMEDIES, § 4.1(1) at 551 (2d ed. 1993); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of
Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1277, 1278-82 (1979). The Supreme Court is open to
characterizing monetary damages as equitable in cases where the damages are viewed as
restitutionary-i.e., damages are being used to prevent unjust enrichment. Chauffeurs,
Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-71 (1990); Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 1937 (1974). In Terry,
the Court ruled that back pay in a breach of contract action against a union for violating a
duty of fair representation did not qualify as restitutionary because it did not seek to prevent
unjust enrichment on the part of the union. 494 U.S. at 570-71.
237. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
back pay is restitutionary in that it "operates to restore to the plaintiff that to which she
would have enjoyed but for the employer's illegal retaliation.").
238. Murphy supra note 224, at 1632; Laycock supra note 236, at 1282-83. See also In
re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Sup. 994, 1002 (D. Mass. 1989) ("Were
the Court to accept the argument that a monetary award is restitutionary simply because it
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characterization was appropriate, which it is not, that still would not render
SOX back pay equitable.239 Historically, monetary restitution claims were
asserted primarily in courts of law, not the courts of equity, through the
writ of assumpsit. They were standardized under the law of quasi-contract,
a distinct species of common-law obligation.2 40  Back pay, at most, is a
restitution claim that is best characterized as legal restitution, not equitable
241
restitution.
Federal court decisions concerning the characterization of Title VII
back pay for Seventh Amendment purposes should not be heeded in the
SOX back pay context for various reasons. Although the Supreme Court
has never specifically ruled on whether back pay under Title VII is legal or
equitable for jury trial purposes,242 lower federal courts have routinely held
that a jury trial is not guaranteed to plaintiffs seeking back pay under Title
VII. 243 Many rationalize that the specific language in Title VII's remedial
provision244 demonstrates that Congress considered back pay as equitable
under Title VII in that back pay was just an "integral part of the statutory
equitable remedy" or "only incidental" to equitable relief provided by the
statute.245  The notion that Title VII back pay is equitable was arguably
supported by the historical "equitable clean-up" doctrine--in certain cases
returns a party to the pre-injury status, little would be left in the realm of compensatory
damages.").
239. See 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5) at 227 (2d. ed. 1993) ("[I]t is said that
back pay is not legal after all, but is equitable because it is restitutionary. This point appears
to be doubly wrong, since a claim does not become equitable by being restitutionary.").
240. Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760); FREDERIC
WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS, § 2, 2-4 (1913). See 1 DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES, § 1.2, 11, § 4.1(1), 556, § 4.2, 570-586 (2d ed. 1993) ("Restitution claims for
money are usually 'claims at law'); 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5), 227 n.15 (2d
ed. 1993) ("Restitution claims at law include all the quasi-contract claims based on
assumpsit, such as those based on common counts like money had and received and
quantum meruit."); Murphy supra note 224, at 1632 ("[M]ost restitutionary claims for
money were asserted in the law courts.");.
241. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S.C. 1869 (2006); see also Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (distinguishing between
restitutionary relief available at law and restitutionary relief available in equity).
242. See Murphy supra note 224, at 1629 ("[T]he Supreme Court has expressly stated
that it has not yet decided whether back pay under Title VII is legal or equitable for jury trial
purposes.").
243. See 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6(10)5, 226 n.10 (2d. ed. 1993) (listing courts of
appeals cases rejecting jury trials on Title VII claims).
244. See supra note 232.
245. Stephen F. Lazor, Comment, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases-
Constitutionally Mandated?, 53 TEX. L. REv. 483, 485, 500 (1974); see also Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)("The demand for back
pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather is an integral part of the statutory
equitable remedy, to be determined through the exercise of the court's discretion, and not by
a jury.").
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when the Chancellor issued an equitable remedy, such as an injunction, he
could award money if it was incidental to the equitable remedy.246 Some
courts also intimated that Title VII back pay was an equitable remedy
because the Title VII remedial language arguably provided discretion to the
courts as to the availability of back pay. 47
The Title VII back pay rationalization should not guide future courts
concerning the characterization of SOX back pay for several reasons. The
Seventh Amendment historical analysis would be useless if courts give a
blank check to Congress to characterize remedies so as to negate the
protections of the Seventh Amendment.248 If the line of Title VII cases are
followed, Congress could label any remedy an equitable one, even if it is
undisputed that the remedy was historically a legal remedy, thus bypassing
the Seventh Amendment. In any event, the SOX remedial provision is
vastly different from that in Title VII. The language does not reflect a
Congressional determination that back pay is equitable. 249 To the contrary,
back pay is labeled as part of compensatory damages. 250 The idea that the
equitable clean-up doctrine can be used to prevent a truly legal claim from
246. See 1 POMEROY, supra note 109, §§ 231-242 (describing when equitable-clean up
doctrine applied); Harkless v. Sweeney Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding that back pay is an integral part of the remedy of injunctive reinstatement and
therefore no jury right attaches); 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 2.6(4), 169, § 2.7, 180 (2d.
ed. 1993) (discussing equitable clean-up doctrine); accord A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-
Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, U. PA. L. REv. 320, 320-31 (1951).
247. 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5), 228 (2d. ed. 1993). See also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 442-43 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (revisiting
prior findings that backpay decisions in the Title VII context are at the discretion of the trial
judge).
248. Concerning his suggestion that the historical test is not the best reading of the
Seventh Amendment, Professor Akhil Reed Amar argues that the core of the Seventh
Amendment was directed at the states, not Congress, in part because "a Congress bent on
evading civil juries could draft statutes sounding in equity, not law." AMAR, supra note 18 1,
at 92. Amar's insight, that the jury right could be malleable based on Congressional
labeling, is certainly a concern. However, if the historical test is to have any impact, courts
must be sensitive to an historical Congressional labeling intended to defeat the jury right,
even if the rationale underlying the Congressional action could be viewed as beneficent.
For example, fear of jury prejudice after the passage of Title VII has been viewed as a
pragmatic reason why the courts refused to grant jury trials in Title VII cases. But see Lazor
supra note 245, at 506 (addressing this concern, but ultimately concluding it to be
"insufficient to override the seventh amendment's mandate.").
249. The SOX statute lists reinstatement, back pay, and special damages under
compensatory damages, but the legislative history indicates that reinstatement, back pay,
and compensatory damages, i.e., non-economic damages, are separate remedies. Although
the statute lists reinstatement under compensatory damages, reinstatement is clearly an
equitable -remedy. The statute does not specifically state whether back pay is legal or
equitable.
250. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(b). Once again, although the statute lists back pay under
compensatory damages, the legislative history indicates that back pay and compensatory
damages are separate remedies.
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being tried to a jury has been soundly rejected, for good reason, by the
Supreme Court due to the merger of law and equity in the federal courts.25" '
Stretched to its outermost limits, the equitable clean-up doctrine would
devour all cases in which legal and equitable remedies are asserted in the
same action, even when the legal and equitable remedies are independent
and equally important to the plaintiff, which severely encroaches on the
jury trial guarantee.252 Finally, the suggestion that the discretionary nature
of a remedy due to Congressional action makes it "equitable" in the sense
that the remedy could only have been brought in the courts of equity is
unpersuasive.2 53 While it is true that the hallmark of equity is the discretion
given to the Chancellor, this general principle hardly means that Congress
should have the power to take a legal remedy and make it equitable by
imbuing the remedy with discretion.254 Regardless, Congress did not imbue
the SOX back pay remedy with such discretion. If a plaintiff proves
unlawful retaliation and lost wages, he is entitled to back pay.255
c. SOX special damages
SOX provides "compensation for any special damages sustained as a
result of the discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees,
and reasonable attorney's fees. 215 6 The "special damages" relief falls under
251. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471 (1962) (holding that the trial
court was incorrect in "striking the demand for trial by jury... based upon the view that the
right to trial by jury may be lost as to legal issues where those issues are characterized as
'incidental' to equitable issues- . .no such rule may be applied in federal court."); Beacon
Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959) (stating that regardless of the presence
of both equitable and legal defenses, the case was best resolved through one full jury trial on
all of the issues).
252. SOX reinstatement and back pay are listed as separate kinds of the more general
"Compensatory Damages" and are therefore not intertwined for Seventh Amendment
purposes. According to the statute a prevailing plaintiff "shall" be entitled to reinstatement,
back pay, and special damages upon a violation. It appears conceivable that in any one
SOX action not all remedies will be available. However, reinstatement, or at least front pay,
and back pay appear to be "automatic" remedies in almost all SOX actions in which the
complainant or plaintiff prevails. KOHN, supra note 2, at 104-05. It appears as though many
SOX cases will arise where the potential back pay award is extremely large and as such will
be hard to view as "incidental" to the reinstatement remedy. See Bureau of National Affairs
(BNA)., Split Second Circuit Rejects Enforcement By Court of Preliminary SOX
Reinstatement, DAILY LABOR REPORT, No. 86, at AA-1 (May 4, 2006) (noting that OSHA
investigators issued a preliminary reinstatement order as well as approximately $350,000 to
complainant for losses and costs resulting from the wrongful termination).
253. See 2 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 6.10(5), 228 (2d ed. 1993).
254. See Doug Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil Jury, 65 Ky. L.J. 769, 775-76 (1977)
(stating that conditioning the right to a jury trial on whether a monetary remedy is
discretionary is a "novel and aberrant" view and should be discarded).
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. 18 U.S.C. §1514A(c)(2)(C) (2000)
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the heading of "Compensatory Damages. 257  Part II.B. argues that the
terms "compensatory damages" and "special damages" in the SOX
remedial provision should be interpreted to include damages to reputation,
emotional distress damages, and other non-pecuniary damages. The
argument arose from an analysis of other federal whistleblower laws, such
as AIR 21, ERA, and the FCA, each of which allow for recovery of the
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages listed above under the umbrella of
either "compensatory" or "special" damages.258  This argument is
consistent with the common law meaning of "special damages, 259 which
Congress is presumed to have intended,260 and SOX's stated policy to
provide "make whole" relief to prevailing whistleblowers.26' Thus, special
and compensatory damages in the form of emotional distress damages and
reputational damages are available under SOX. These damages qualify as
legal relief, not equitable relief, because they traditionally have been
associated with the law courts and determined by juries.262
The nature of the SOX action and remedial provision demonstrate that
the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial on certain SOX
claims. The SOX action is most analogous to historical forms of action
that were brought in the law courts. 2 63 The SOX remedies are split between
257. Id.
258. See supra Part II.B.
259. Special damages are those that, although flowing from the wrong, are unusual for
the type of claim in question. 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
9.08[1][a] (1997); CHARLES MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, § 8, 33
(1935). Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(g) requires a plaintiff to specifically plead "special damages."
Avita v. Metro. Club of Chicago, 49 F.3d 1219, 1226 (7th Cir. 1995). In the SOX context,
lost wages in the form of back pay are general damages because they are normal in wrongful
discharge cases; emotional distress damages and reputational damages are special damages
because they are not the standard or common damages in wrongful discharge cases.
260. It is a longstanding principle of statutory construction that Congress intends to
adopt the common-law definition of a statutory term unless otherwise stated. See Morisette
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word
in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may
be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not a departure from them.").
261. KOHN, supra note 2, at 108. In wrongful discharge/whistleblower cases,
compensatory damages have included compensation for "emotional distress, pain and
suffering, mental anguish, lost future earnings capacity . . . harassment, humiliation, loss of
professional reputation, ostracism." Id. See also Hanna v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 348 F. Supp.
2d 1332, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing damages for reputational injury available under
SOX); HENRY H. PERITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 5.33, 319 (2nd ed.
1987) ("[C]ourts have awarded compensatory damages for the tort of wrongful dismissal
which include lost earnings, lost future earnings, expenses of finding a new job, and mental
anguish.").
262. See supra note 109.
263. See supra Part I1.A. 1.
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legal and equitable remedies. SOX reinstatement is an equitable remedy.
2'6
SOX back pay, emotional distress damages, reputational damages, and
other compensatory/special damages are legal remedies.265 Thus, when a
SOX plaintiff asserts in his original complaint in federal court that he seeks
reinstatement, back pay, and special damages for emotional distress, or
merely reinstatement and back pay, the action asserts legal remedies such
that the right to a jury trial attaches as to all issues concerning the legal
remedies, even though an equitable issue is also present in the form of a
request for injunctive relief.
266
3. Allocating the Functions of Judge and Jury
The fact that the jury right attaches to a SOX action in federal district
court does not mean that the jury will hear every issue that may arise in the
case.2 67 Del Monte Dunes and Markman elaborate on how to determine
which issues must go to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the
jury right.268  It is preferable to again engage in a historical analysis,
comparing the modem issue to an analogous issue that existed in 1791
when history is clear as to whom decided the older issue-the judge or the
jury.269  If history does not supply an answer, existing precedent and
270functional considerations guide the determination. In the absence of an
exact historical analogue, in order to determine which SOX issues go to the
judge and which to the jury one must look to the distinction between
questions of fact and questions of law.271  Generally, the Seventh
Amendment seeks to ensure that juries decide questions of fact and judges
264. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
265. See supra Part III.A.2.b.-c.
266. WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 164, § 2308, 82. The Supreme Court now has made it
wholly clear that a claim that otherwise would be triable to a jury must be so tried even
though it may be thought "incidental" to a claim for an injunction. The order of trial must
be arranged so that any issues common to the legal claim and the claim for an injunction are
tried to a jury at the outset, with the court thereafter resolving any purely equitable issues in
the case. Id.
267. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 731 (1999)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("To say that respondents had the right to a jury trial on their § 1983
claim is not to say that they were entitled to have the jury decide every issue. The precise
scope of the jury's function is the second Seventh Amendment issue before us here .... ").
268. Id. at 718-23, 731-32; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377-
91(1996).
269. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718; Markman, 517 U.S. at 378.
270. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718; Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
271. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720 ("In actions at law predominantly factual
issues are in most cases allocated to the jury"); Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (favoring a
methodology, which, if history does not supply an answer, recognizes the historical
preference for juries to make factual determinations and for judges to decide legal
questions).
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decide questions of law."'
An historical analysis sheds some light on which SOX issues must be
decided by the jury in order to preserve the substance of the Seventh
Amendment right. English juries in the late eighteenth century assessed
economic and at times, non-economic damages because damages
assessments were primarily fact-based determinations.27 3 Accordingly, the
amount of back pay, reputational damages, and mental anguish damages in
a SOX action ought to be determined by a jury. The SOX liability
questions, however, have no exact counterparts, thus complicating an
historical analysis.
Generally, the SOX action is analogous to breach of implied contract,
tort, and qui tam claims274 which were brought in the English common law
courts. The elements of a SOX claim-protected conduct, employer
knowledge of protected conduct, adverse personnel action, and
causation75-are not easily identifiable with elements of the old common
law forms of action that were precursors to modern-day contract and tort
claims. Moreover, even when a question exists as to a possible historical
tort or contract counterpart to a SOX liability, it is difficult to discern
whether the historical issue was one for the jury or the judge at English
common law. For example, while causation in modern-day negligence law
and causation in SOX might be viewed as similar concepts, the concept of
causation in the common law actions of trespass and case was decidedly
different from a present-day understanding of causation.276 At English
272. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935)
(reiterating that the Seventh Amendment aims "to retain the common-law distinction
between the province of the court and that of the jury, whereby, in the absence of express or
implied consent to the contrary, issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues of
fact are to be determined by the jury... "). See also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476,
485-86 (1935) (explaining that questions of fact shall be decided by the jury and the court
shall not deprive the jury of this practice); accord Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref.
Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-99 (1931); Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S.
593, 596(1897).
273. See Scott v. Sheperd, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (K.B. 1773) (affirming judgment where
jury awarded plaintiff damages); Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial
Administration and the Development of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 35, 64 (1983) (discussing the necessity of a jury assessment in forms of
actions that allowed a damages remedy); Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation:
The Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 360
(1995) (noting that before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, English juries assessed
compensatory damages in accordance with their fact-finding role); George T. Washington,
Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 LAW Q. REv. 345, 354-56, 364-66 (1931)
(explaining that juries received more deference in determining damages in actions in tort
than in actions in contract).
274. See supra Part III.A. I.
275. See infra Part III.A.3.
276. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 392-400 (2d
ed. 1981) (describing the narrow understanding of causation that defined both actions of
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common law, causation was essentially a question of directness-whether
"the defendant had directly done the harm." '277 Likely, as a practical matter,
English juries considered questions of "directness" in trespass cases 278,
especially given the practice of confining jury questions to a single
question of fact279 and the oftentimes lack of a clear separation between fact
and law.28° However, historical evidence suggests that the test of directness
had become a rule of law by the last quarter of the eighteenth century.28'
Perhaps the closest historical analogue to a SOX issue is whether an
English qui tam plaintiff reported illegal activity.282  This is similar to the
protected conduct inquiry under SOX. It is likely that an English jury
decided whether the qui tam plaintiff reported illegal activity in a qui tam
action brought as a writ of debt, which would tend to indicate that the SOX
protected activity issue is a jury question.283
The historical inquiry, while useful, does not provide a clear answer as
to which SOX issues must be tried to the jury. Therefore, we look to the
characterization of various issues as either legal or factual under current
whistleblower and employment discrimination laws and the policy reasons
why a jury, as opposed to a judge, should decide a particular SOX issue.284
This pragmatic search indicates that SOX issues can in most cases be
properly delineated as either legal questions for the judge or factual
questions for the jury.
The SOX employee protection provision prohibits a covered employer
from discriminating against a covered employee for providing information
or assisting in investigations concerning fraud against shareholders.285
SOX actions are governed by the legal burdens of proof established in the
AIR 21 Act. 86 As previously alluded to, a SOX plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct;
trespass and case).
277. Id. at 395.
278. Id. at 396-97.
279. Francis, supra note 273, at 68-73.
280. Washington, supra note 273, at 346.
281. MILSOM, supra note 276, at 397.
282. See supra Part II.A. 1.
283. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999)
(1999) (affirming the general principle that a federal statutory claim that allows for
monetary damages upon the violation of an imposed legal duty sounds in tort, and thus a
plaintiff asserting such a claim is entitled to a jury trial); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
195-96 (1974) (same).
284. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718-21 (when the historical analysis yields no
discernible conclusion, consider precedent, the relative interpretive skills of judges and
juries, and the statutory policies that should be furthered by the allocation in determining
whether to allocate an issue to the judge or jury for Seventh Amendment purposes).
285. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
286. 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (2000).
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(2) the employer knew he engaged in protected conduct; (2) he suffered an
unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the protected conduct was a
contributing factor in the unfavorable action.2 7 An employer can avoid
liability by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of the
protected conduct.28" These four elements and the employer's affirmative
defense are the heart of a SOX action. They are primarily factual issues to
be decided by a jury. In contrast, there are numerous issues in a SOX
action that are essentially legal questions that must be resolved by a judge.
The jury has no role to play in deciding such questions.
a. SOX questions of law
Due in part to the unique two-tiered enforcement system established
by the statute, administrative law, administrative appeals, and federal
judges confront challenging legal questions under the SOX statute. These
include, but are not limited to, jurisdictional questions, coverage questions,
procedural questions, evidentiary questions, and constitutional questions.8 9
Judges have ruled on whether the statute operates retroactively,29 the effect
of filing a SOX complaint in federal district court on the jurisdiction of the
administrative law judge in the administrative proceeding,29' whether the
statute applies extraterritorially, 292 whether a non-publicly traded subsidiary
of a publicly traded parent company is a covered employer,293 the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege in a particular case, 94 the
propriety of economic reinstatement or front pay in lieu of reinstatement,295
and whether the right to jury trial is guaranteed by the statute or
Constitution.296 These are just a sample of the legal questions that have
287. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a)-(b)(2)(B)(iii)-(iv); Collins v. Beazer Homes, 334 F. Supp. 2d
1365, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2004); Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, ALJ No. 2004-
SOX-35, slip op. at 7 (ARB September 30, 2005); Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., ARB No. 04-
059, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-8, slip op. at 8 (ARB July 29, 2005).
288. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a)-(b)(2)(B)(iv); Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., ARB No. 04-059,
ALJ No. 2003-SOX-8, slip op. at 8 (ARB July 29, 2005).
289. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Whistleblower Digest, U.S. Department of Labor,
Office of Administrative Law Judges, available at http://www.oalj.gov.
290. McIntyre v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2003-SOX-23, slip op. at
12 (ALJ Jan. 16, 2004).
291. Stone v. Duke Energy Corp., 432 F.3d 320, 323 (4th Cir. 2005).
292. Camero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 7-18 (1st Cir. 2005).
293. Bothwell v. Am. Income Life, 2005-SOX-57, slip op. at 5 (ALJ Sept. 19, 2005).
294. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15, slip. op. at 2-3 (ALJ Aug. 15,
2003).
295. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., ARB No. 06-062, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-15,
slip. op. at 5-6 (ARB June 9, 2006).
296. Murray v. TXU Corp., No. Civ.A.3:03-CV-0888-P, 2005 WL 1356444, at *1-2, 86
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), P41, 981 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2005).
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already been addressed by judges. Judges will have to rule on many more
legal questions in the future. As a general principle, the interpretive
questions posed by the statute concerning jurisdiction, coverage, procedure,
and evidence are legal questions to be resolved by judges.297 The Seventh
Amendment does not have any impact on these questions.
b. SOX questions offact and mixed questions offact and law
Whether the elements of a SOX action have been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence and damages determinations are generally
factual questions for the jury.298  Regarding the SOX elements, it is
297. Professor Kirgis, has recently examined the aspect of Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence considered in Part III.A.3 of this article: how to allocate particular questions
to the judge or jury in a case where the right to jury trial exists. Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to
a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125
(2003). Professor Kirgis argues that the fact-law distinction should guide courts in
determining the questions that must go to the jury and proposes an inferential analysis for
distinguishing "fact" questions that must go to the jury from other questions that should be
decided by the judge. Id. at 1130. Under this test, "[a] question of fact is one that requires
for its answer inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute." Id. at
1158. By contrast, a question of law calls "for either deductive inferences or inductive
inferences leading to conclusions beyond the transactions or occurrences in dispute." Id. at
1130. I will examine Kirgis' inferential test, which I find illuminating, later in this article.
Kirgis' inferential account of the fact-law distinction correctly presupposes that most
decisions made during the litigation process are simply outside the realm of the jury even
though those decisions require the decision-maker, i.e., the judge, to make certain "factual"
findings. Id. at 1145-46. Kirgis describes this as the judicial screening function and defines
a screening decision as any decision that entails "regulating the actions of the parties to
ensure that the adjudicative process unfolds in a way that comports with systemic norms."
Id. at 1146. He notes that "judicial screening" questions are often referred to by courts as
questions of "law," but that such description is a "matter of convention rather than as a
counterpoint to decisions of 'fact."' Id. There are three basic types of judicial screening
questions which are outside the province of the jury: (1) questions addressing the propriety
of the chosen forum (e.g., jurisdictional questions); (2) questions about what
data/information can be considered by the decision-maker (e.g., evidentiary questions); and
(3) questions about whether a particular question can be posed to the decision-maker (e.g.,
the propriety of submitting a proposed jury question). Id. at 1147-1153.
The SOX questions concerning jurisdiction, coverage, procedure, and evidence, which
are set forth above, fit within the judicial screening function described by Professor Kirgis
and may not be decided by a jury.
298. The Seventh Amendment does not prevent the use of procedural devices to dismiss
SOX actions which do not have sufficient evidentiary proof on each SOX element. See e.g.,
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656-60 (1935) (recognizing that
sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law for the court). As in other federal
employment retaliation/discrimination cases, whether a SOX case gets to the jury depends
on the quality and amount of evidence introduced during the summary judgment stage
and/or during trial, even if, as a general proposition, the determination as to whether a SOX
plaintiff proved an element of his cause of action is a factual determination. A
determination by a judge that a case can only be decided one way does not violate the
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instructive to examine the way in which statutory elements in other areas of
employment law have been characterized by the courts. Federal
employment retaliation law, whistleblower statutes, and First Amendment
retaliation law correctly treat causation and the employer's knowledge of
protected conduct as factual issues for the jury provided sufficient evidence
is presented on these elements. 99
Retaliation cases conflict on whether the protected conduct inquiry is
a question of fact or law. Most courts interpret the "opposition" clause of
the Title VII retaliation provision to require the employee to demonstrate
that he had a "reasonable belief' that the employer engaged in unlawful
employment practices in order to prove protected conduct.300  The
employee's "reasonable belief' is viewed objectively, but the plaintiff does
not have to prove that the opposed conduct in fact violated Title VII.3°'
The "reasonable belief' standard provides considerable room for a fact-
finder to make a determination as to whether an employee engaged in
protected conduct under Title VII, but many courts view the issue of
whether actions constitute protected conduct under Title VII as questions of
Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2005)
(rejecting contention that courts may never grant summary judgment on either the second or
third prongs of the retaliation test); Kirgis, supra note 297, at 1151-52 (explaining that
courts consistently hold that judges do not violate the Seventh Amendment when deciding
that a question can be answered only one way); Ellen E. Seward, The Seventh Amendment
and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 573, 592-632 (2003) (discussing
transformation of fact into law).
299. See Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2002) ("A
jury, however, can find [Title VII] retaliation even if the [corporate] agent denies direct
knowledge of a plaintiff s protected activities, for example, so long as the jury finds that the
circumstances evidence knowledge of the protected activities or the jury concludes that an
agent is acting explicitly or implicit upon the order of a superior who has the requisite
knowledge."); King v. Preferred Tech. Group, 166 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that a question of fact existed for the jury as to whether employer terminated plaintiffs
employment for legitimate, non-retaliatory reason or because of plaintiffs use of FMLA
leave); Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 933 (11 th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the Secretary of Labor's determination as to whether an ERA-whistleblower was fired
for engaging in protected activity or for legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is an
adjudicative, factual finding that must be supported by substantial evidence); Curinga v.
City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that whether constitutionally
protected speech was a motivating factor in the discharge is a question of fact); Clements v.
Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing
conflicting evidence that raised fact issue sufficient to deny summary judgment as to
whether decision-maker knew of employee's First Amendment protected whistle-blowing
activity).
300. Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir.
1981).
301. See Byers v. The Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that plaintiff need not prove that employer's conduct is unlawful but holding
that plaintiffs belief regarding such conduct is objectively unreasonable).
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law.3"2 Similarly, in First Amendment retaliation claims, whether speech is
constitutionally protected is uniformly regarded as a question of law for the
court.
30 3
Recent Supreme Court authority suggests that the adverse
employment action element under Title VII is best viewed as a question of
fact. The scope of the adverse employment action element of Title VII
retaliation law has varied widely among the circuits until recently. 30 4 In
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v. White, the Court
held that the Title VII retaliation provision covers only those employer
actions that would have been "materially adverse" to a reasonable
employee or job applicant.30 5 The Court upheld a jury's verdict that a
reassignment to more onerous job duties and a thirty-seven day suspension
without pay constituted retaliation under this standard.30 6  White
contemplates the fact-finder, i.e., the jury, determining whether an
employer's actions constitute retaliation when sufficient evidence exists for
302. See Bechtel Constr. Co., 50 F.3d 926 at 931 (stating that the determination as to
whether general inquiries regarding safety constitute protected activity under whistleblower
protection provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act is a question of law to be reviewed
on a de novo basis); Heckmann v. Detroit Chief of Police, 705 N.W.2d 689, 698 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005) (stating that whether plaintiff engaged in protected activity under Michigan
Whistleblower Protection Act presents a question of law). Compare George v. Sw. Bell
Tel. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31195, * 11 (N.D. Tex. December 5, 2005) (concluding that
plaintiffs summary-judgment evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that the plaintiff
reasonably believed the complained of conduct was unlawful and thus a fact issue existed as
to whether opposition constituted protected activity) with Barnes v. Small, 840 F.3d 972,
976 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (deciding that the protected activity determination is a question of law
because it is largely based on an interpretation of Title VII), and Broderick v. Donaldson,
338 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting that "the determination as to whether the
memorandum is protected activity is a question of law because it relies on an interpretation
of Title VII"), and Carter-Obayuwana v. Howard Univ., 764 A.2d 779, 790 (D.C. 2001)
("Whether actions by an employee constitute protected activity [under Title VII] is a
question of law...").
303. See Curinga 357 F.3d at 310 (weighing employee's interest in speech against
government employer's interest is a matter of law); accord Horstkoetter v. Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1271 (10thCir. 1998); Orange v. District of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267,
1272 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 809 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11 th Cir. 1987).
304. See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (U.S. June 22,
2006) (resolving the circuit split); Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation
Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain
Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. REv. 115, 134-139 (1998) (providing detailed
overview of each circuit's construction of the adverse action element of Title VII retaliation
claims); Joel A. Kravetz, Deterrence v. Material Harm: Finding the Appropriate Standard
to Define an "Adverse Action " in Retaliation Claims Brought Under the Applicable Equal
Employment Opportunity Statutes, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 315, 321-55 (2001-2002)
(conducting a circuit-by-circuit analysis in an attempt to define "adverse action" in the
context of §704(A) retaliation claims).
305. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
306. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2416.
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a reasonable jury to conclude that the employer's action would be
materially adverse to a reasonable employee.
The SOX elements should generally be viewed as factual
determinations to be made by a SOX jury. Like Title VII law, the
causation and employer's knowledge of protected conduct elements in
SOX actions are pure factual determinations to be made by a jury when
conflicting evidence is presented by employee and employer.37 The
characterization of the SOX protected conduct element is trickier. It is
similar to the Title VII protected conduct element in that a SOX plaintiff
need only prove he had a "reasonable belie[f]" that he engaged in protected
activity. 308 However, it is more appropriate for a juror to determine
whether someone "reasonably believed" the employer committed a Title
VII violation than whether someone "reasonably believed" the employer
violated securities laws or other laws that protected fraud against
shareholders. Both determinations require an understanding of what
actions may in fact violate the law (or at least what actions could
307. Under Professor Kirgis' inferential test for determining a question of fact as
distinguished from a question of law, when a question involves inductive inferences it is a
question of fact that must be resolved by the jury under the Seventh Amendment. My
characterization of the causation and employer's knowledge of protected conduct elements
as questions of fact to be resolved by the jury is consistent with Kirgis' description of the
basic types of factual conclusions jurors in circumstances that require inductive reasoning.
Kirgis states:
At least for purposes of adjudication, inductive reasoning may be used to reach
conclusions of three basic types: that an event or condition in the past or
present probably has occurred or is occurring; that an event or condition in the
future probably will occur; or that a hypothetical event or condition probably
would occur given some postulated set of circumstances, a type of reasoning
known as the counterfactual conditional. The phrase "events or conditions" in
these formulations is intended to encompass virtually all phenomena in the
world, including the identity of things or persons, the occurrence of physical
events or human acts, mental states, and relations of cause and effect.
Kirgis, supra note 297, at 1155 (emphasis added).
Whether (and when) an employer knew that an employee engaged in activity alleged
to be SOX-protected falls within Kirgis' first type of inductive-reasoning conclusions
because it concerns a determination regarding an actual historical event or condition derived
from inferences and the judgment of witnesses' credibility. Id. at 1155. Whether an
employee's SOX-protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse employment
action suffered by the employee, and/or whether the employer would have taken the same
employment action regardless of the protected activity is a causation question of the third
type described by Kirgis because it requires a probabilistic inference based on the
circumstances surrounding the employee's employment situation and the actual personnel
decision. Id. at 1157 ("In their focus on the likely course of events, both questions of but-
for cause and questions of proximate cause require probabilistic inferences about
hypothetical conditions in the world-the events that were most likely to happen given the
state of the world prior to the injury.").
308. Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-35, slip op. at 8
(ARB Sept. 30, 2005).
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conceivably fall within the scope of those laws) and to some degree involve
considerations of credibility. 0 9 The credibility judgments, however, are
dependent on one's knowledge of what could possibly violate or impact the
underlying substantive law, be it Title VII or the various federal laws
prohibiting fraud against shareholders. It could be argued that the
protected conduct determination is better suited to the common sense of the
jury if it is believed that the jury intuitively understands or can be quickly
educated on the fundamental tenets of Title VII anti-discrimination law.310
However, given the complexities of the various federal laws relating to
fraud against shareholders, it would seem that in most cases a trained
specialist, the judge, would be best suited to determine whether particular
employee actions constitute protected activity under SOX.3 ' The policy-
oriented and complex aspects of whether a SOX plaintiff engaged in
protected conduct indicates the protected conduct determination is best
viewed as a mixed question of fact and law to be resolved by a jury or
judge depending on the individual circumstances of the particular case at
309. See e.g., Tuttle v. Johnson Controls Battery Div., 2004-SOX-76, slip op. at 3-4
(ALJ Jan. 3, 2005) (explaining that employee's claim that he reasonably believed the
employer violated one of the laws or regulations enumerated in SOX whistleblower statute
must be examined under both subjective and objective standards).
310. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996)
(conceding that in theory there could be a case where a jury is responsible for making
simple credibility judgments despite the fact that sophisticated terms of art are at issue).
311. Professor Kirgis' article elaborates on the difficulties courts and commentators have
encountered in determining whether questions of reasonableness are questions of fact for the
jury or questions of law for the judge. He explains that such determination varies with the
type of reasonableness question at issue. For example, the question of negligence in a civil
case has historically been viewed as one for the jury. In contrast, in malicious prosecution
cases, the question whether a person had a "reasonable belief' that another committed a
crime is reserved for the judge. Kirgis, supra note 297, at 1162-70. Kirgis reconciles this
apparent discrepancy through the lens of his inferential account of the fact-law distinction
by noting that determining reasonableness in a negligence case involves making inductive
inferences about the nature of the defendant's conduct, whereas determining whether a
person had a reasonable belief in the guilt of another does not require such inferences. Id. at
1169-70 ("A decision maker tasked with making that decision [whether a person had a
reasonable belief that another committed a crime] needs nothing but his own sense of how
to characterize events in the world. The decision maker simply compares the apparent
conduct of the accused with the decision maker's storehouse of knowledge about what
constitutes apparent criminal conduct.").
The question of whether an employee had a "reasonable belief' that his employer
violated any federal law concerning fraud against shareholders is similar to the malicious
prosecution question in that it does not involve any inductive inferences. Once it is
determined what the alleged SOX-protected plaintiff complained about, it is simply up to
the decision maker to compare the alleged fraudulent conduct with the decision maker's
"storehouse of knowledge" about what could conceivably constitute fraud against
shareholders under the various federal laws. Due to the complexities of these federal fraud
laws, a federal judge is likely better equipped than a juror to make such a decision.
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hand, but typically by the judge.31 2
The characterization of the SOX adverse employment action is
nuanced as well. The adverse employment action determination lies
somewhere between a pure factual determination of the causation element
and a mixed question of fact and law determination of the protected
conduct element. It is an open question how "unfavorable" the
employment action must be to fall within the scope of the SOX anti-
retaliation provision. It is unanswered whether the "materially adverse"
standard from White governs, or if a broader or stricter standard controls.3" 3
312. Compare Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., ARB No. 04-059, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-8, slip
op. at 9 (ARB July 29, 2005) (stating that whether equity research analyst's "refusal" to
raise her stock rating during a review committee meeting constituted protected activity is a
legal question) and Harvey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., ARB Nos. 04-114 and 115, ALJ Nos.
04-SOX-20 and 04-SOX-36, USDOL/OALJ REPORTER at 14 (ARB June 2, 2006)
(dismissing SOX action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted because
complainant's letters sent to the company's Board of Directors and Executives, which
informed management about questionable personnel practices, corporate expenditures with
which the employee disagreed, and possible FMLA and FLSA violations, did not constitute
SOX-protected activity), with Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, ALJ No. 2004-
SOX-35, slip op. at 7-8 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005) (confirming that finding by AIJ that
complainant did not engage in protected activity is conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence) and Collins v. Beazer Homes, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1377-80 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(holding that, upon employer's motion for summary judgment, a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether SOX plaintiff engaged in protected activity and that reasonable
jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that SOX plaintiff engaged in
protected activity).
313. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2002) (stating that an employer may not "discharge,
demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee
in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
employee.") (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.102(a). Like the Title VII anti-retaliation
provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000), the scope of the adverse employment action
part of the SOX statute depends on the interpretation of the term "discriminate." The Office
of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower Digest already
contains several contradictory opinions from administrative law judges concerning the scope
of the SOX adverse employment action element. Compare Halloum v. Intel Corp., No.
2003-SOX-7, slip op. at 10 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004) (adopting a "reasonably likely to deter
employees from making protected disclosures" standard, advocating a test for unfavorable
employment action that encompasses more than simply economic actions) and Hendrix v.
Am. Airlines, 2004-SOX-23 (ALJ Dec. 9, 2004) (applying an expansive definition of
adverse action based on whistleblower law, concluding that placement on a lay-off list
amounts to an adverse employment action even though the person's name was removed
from the list before the lay-offs came to fruition and thus the person suffered no tangible job
consequence), with Dolan v. EMC Corporation, 2004-SOX-1, slip op. at 3 (ALJ Mar. 24,
2004) (holding that a SOX adverse employment action must have some tangible job
consequence and unfavorable performance evaluations, absent tangible job consequences,
do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action). The ALJ ruled in Dolan that the
complainant's negative performance evaluation was not an adverse employment action
because it did not result in a lower salary, jeopardize job security, or cause any tangible job
detriment. The Halloum, Hendrix, and Dolan decisions were decided prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad v. White.
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Regardless of the standard adopted, the determination as to whether this
SOX element is proven by a preponderance of the evidence should be one
for the jury. Jurors should obviously be charged on the proper standard,
and judges must contain juries whose collective imaginations go beyond
the pale. 3 4 But jurors, many of whom are either employees or employers,
typically possess the requisite common sense and experience to
differentiate the trivial employer action from the employer action that
would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining about corporate
fraud. In most cases, that sort of a determination should be a factual one
for the jury, not a legal one for the judge.
B. Alternative Approaches
The historical test remains ensconced in Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence, but over the years, courts and commentators have advocated
for various exceptions and alternative approaches to this traditional
analysis. 3 5 The complexity exception-the notion that a purely functional
approach to Seventh Amendment analysis should replace the historical test,
and the view that the extent of the right to jury trial in civil cases in federal
cases is left entirely to the discretion of Congress-warrants explanation.31 6
Treatment of the question of a SOX right to jury trial under these
approaches is considered, but the question of whether the stated exception
or alternative approaches should replace the traditional historical test is
beyond the scope of this article and will not be dealt with in any
comprehensive fashion. However, a vision of the jury as the constitutional
actor that can best vindicate the community's sense of justice should
influence how we view whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the
314. See e.g., Erickson v. EPA, ALJ No. 1999-CAA-2 at 25 (ARB May 31, 2006)
(stating that co-worker "shunning" that has no tangible job consequences is not an adverse
employment action as a matter of law); BNA, Justices Wrestle With Appropriate Standard
in Argument Regarding Title VII Retaliation, DAILY LAB. REP., Apr. 18, 2006, at AA-1
(relating when Justice Scalia questioned Sheila White's attorney, Donald A. Donati, during
an oral argument in the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe R.R. v. White case about whether
a broad standard for adverse employment actions would lead to trivial claims ending up
before a jury and stated that "juries can have amazing imaginations.").
315. See supra Part III.A.
316. The state-law incorporation approach is advocated by Akhil Reed Amar in The Bill
of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction. Amar, supra note 181, at 89-90. Charles W.
Wolman also examined the approach in The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment. 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 712-18, 732-34 (1973) (stating that state law
incorporation is an alternative approach that appears to have some historical support, but
would also raise numerous practical problems if ever adopted by the Court). As applied to
the SOX action, the right to jury trial in a SOX case under this approach would depend on
the law with respect to jury trials of the forum state in which the federal-court SOX action is
brought. No attempt is made to analyze the SOX jury right in each of the 50 states under
this approach.
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right to a jury trial on SOX claims.
1. The Complexity Exception and Functional Approach
Some commentators argue that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial in civil cases is severely proscribed in complex cases." 7 Although
considerable debate exists as to what constitutes a complex case,
318
commentators in favor of a complexity exception to the Seventh
Amendment have summarized various characteristics of a trial that should
play a part in considering whether a case is too complex to be heard by a
jury. They include the operative details and nature of the trial (number of
parties, probable length of trial, the amount of evidence and corresponding
exhibits to be introduced into the record), the nature of the evidence to be
proposed at trial (the degree to which the average juror can realistically
understand any sophisticated evidence presented in the case), and the
difficulty in understanding any complex substantive law relevant to the
case. 319 Of those proponents of a complexity exception, some favor the
exception on the ground that the English common law and American
colonial law took complex cases out of the hands of jurors,320 others on due
process grounds,32' and a few make arguments based purely on pragmatic
317. See infra notes 318-325.
318. See Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1754-1803 (1992) (stating that
complex litigation involves the inability to guarantee reasoned judgment and procedures
created by the assertion of increased judicial power clash with at least one of the four pillars
of transsubstantivism-inter-transactional neutrality, intra-substantive neutrality,
transactional neutrality, or inter-personal neutrality).
319. See Jeffrey Oakes, The Right to Strike the July Trial Demand in Complex
Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243,290-293 (1980) (giving examples of complex litigation
cases); Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The Constitutionality of a Complexity Exception to the
Seventh Amendment, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 883-84 (1998) (describing the
characteristics that assist the court in the determination of whether a case is too complex for
a jury trial).
320. See James S. Campbell & Nicholas Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A
Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1980) (recalling that it was the
practice in English common law to try complex cases as proceedings in equity, without a
jury); Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on
the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1637-38 (1983) (arguing that the exception is
favorable based on practices of American colonial law); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of
Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 43, 44, 107 (1980) (stating that American colonial law preferred jury trials because they
were speedier); see also Douglas King, Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 613 (1984) (positing that complex
cases were not possible in English common law).
321. See Oakes, supra note 319, at 298 (asserting that if a jury is functionally unable to
reach an intelligent decision in a particular complex case, then any decision reached by that
jury will violate the due process clause); Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr., Frank D. Zielinski, &
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322 of
reasons. Many of these proponents interpret Supreme Court cases over
the past forty years as opening the door to a complexity exception.
323
Alternatively, opponents of a complexity exception vigorously disagree
that history supports a complexity exception,324 argue that empirical data
does not support the view that jurors are incompetent to understand
complex legal issues,32 5 claim that procedural and judicial management
improvements should allay any due process concerns, 326 and posit that
jealous preservation of the jury right must be maintained because the jury
George M. Curtiss, III, A Bicentennial Transition: Modern Alternatives to Seventh
Amendment Jury Trial in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 61, 90-95, 104 (1988)
(discussing the issue of adopting the due process clause of the fifth amendment as a means
of excluding complex cases from the seventh amendment right to jury trial).
322. See Patrick Lynch, The Case for Striking Jury Demands in Complex Antitrust
Litigation, 1 REv. LITIG. 3, 3 (1980) ("The jury is as inappropriate to some antitrust cases
today as the wild west gunfighter is to modem Abilene. Judges who insist that the jury is
right for all times and all cases make the same mistake we see portrayed [in television
stories involving the magnificent, aging performer who refuses to acknowledge his or her
limitations].").
323. See Miron, supra note 319, at 886 ("[T]he Supreme Court has opened the door to a
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment with its reasoning in Ross v. Bernard and,
more recently, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.").
324. See Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in
Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 830 (1980) (stating that there is no
historical support to avoid a jury trial in cases involving complicated facts).
325. See Maxwell M. Blecher & Howard F. Daniels, In Defense of Juries in Complex
Antitrust Litigation, 1 REv. LITIG. 47, 74-78 (1980) (stating that empirical studies and
scholarly interpretations of those studies are mixed as to how well jurors fare in complex
cases); see also Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans, & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen
Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727,
764 (1991) ("Thus, the overall picture of the jury that emerges from the available data
indicates that juries are capable of deciding even very complex cases, especially if
procedures to enhance jury competence are used."); Margaret Moses, The Jury-Trial Right
in the UCC: On a Slippery Slope, 54 SMU L. REv. 561, 593 (2001) ("With respect to a
jury's handling of technical or complex issues, a number of studies have concluded that
juries handle complex issues well, and that there is no reason to believe that judges fare
better in the face of complexity than jurors."); Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A
Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 49, 55 (1997) ("Several studies
buttress the contention of lay jury incompetence in complex cases.").
326. See Blecher and Daniels, supra note 325, at 88-91 (outlining suggestions of
procedural measures that would serve to address or minimize concerns about the practical
limitations of juries); James L. Flannery, Comment, Complex Civil Litigation: Reconciling
the Demands of Due Process with the Right to Trial by Jury, U. PiTT. L. REv. 693, 694
(1981) (suggesting that separation of issues and use of a special master to hear and simplify
complex evidence should resolve the due process concern); Steven I. Friedland, The
Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 220
(1990) (contesting that clear and orderly procedures would decrease jury passivity); Lisa S.
Meyer, Comment, Taking the "Complexity" Out of Complex Litigation: Preserving the
Constitutional Right to Civil Jury Trial, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 337, 360-71 (1993) (asserting
that active involvement by the judiciary is critical in managing complex litigation).
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implements important public policies, complexity notwithstanding.327
Even if the complexity exception is constitutional, SOX actions do not
fit within this exception. Generally, the number of parties involved in a
SOX action is small (typically one plaintiff and one defendant), the length
of trial time should be relatively short, and the evidence should be
understandable to jurors if presented in a straightforward manner.
Moreover, it would be unwise to say that SOX actions are categorically
complex merely because they often involve complaints about sophisticated
securities regulation and accounting practices. The question is not whether
SOX actions are complex in the abstract; it is whether the particular issue
the jury must decide is over its collective head.328
Considerable complexity could arise in determining whether a
plaintiff engaged in SOX-protected activity. But, the protected-activity
issue, as previously mentioned, should be resolved by the judge because it
is a question of law. A SOX jury's main role as the fact finder is to resolve
the issue of causation, which it is qualified to do, because a SOX causation
determination entails making probabilistic assessments grounded in real-
world experience. The causation determination in a SOX case boils down
to a determination of whether the SOX-protected activity was a
"motivating factor" or "contributing factor" in the adverse employment
action.329 The resolution of the causation question in a particular SOX case
may be difficult because the evidence conflicts, but it is not "complex" in
the sense that the issue is so technical in nature that it is beyond the
comprehension of twelve ordinary citizens. 'This type of causation
determination is frequently made by juries in other employment
discrimination and whistleblower cases.33°
327. See Maxwell M. Blecher & Candace E. Carlo, Toward More Effective Handling of
Complex Antitrust Cases, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 727, 744 (1980) (stating that the jury is
integral to a democratic government); Blecher and Daniels, supra note 325, at 78-87 (stating
that the jury is integral to a democratic government).
328. See Wilkinson, supra note 321, at 84 ("The inquiry [under the complexity
exception] is not whether a case as a whole is too complex for a jury because it fits a
particular category ... but whether particular issues in the case are so technical in nature
that they are beyond the reasoned and comprehending decision-making power of the jury.").
329. See Collins v. Beazer Homes, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 13758-80 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(discussing the necessary factors to prove causation); Halloum v. Intel Corp., No. 2003-
SOX-7, at 7-8 (ARB Jan. 31, 2006) (same).
330. See Carter v. Diamondback Golf Club, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3739, *23, 97
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1086 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that in mixed-motive religious
discrimination case under Title VII, circumstantial evidence raised a genuine issue of
material fact on causation such that the jury must determine whether illegitimate reasons
motivated the employer to terminate the plaintiff's employment); EEOC v. Int'l House of
Pancakes, 411 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (declaring that in an age
discrimination case under the ADEA, sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to
conclude that restaurant's stated reason for ending waitress's employment relationship was a
pretext for age discrimination); Robinson v. Hilton Hospitality, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Closely related to the complexity exception is the notion that jury trial
actions should be separated from non-jury trial actions under the Seventh
Amendment based on the relative abilities of judges and juries. For
example, in Ross v. Bernhard, the Court spoke for the first time of the
"practical abilities and limitations of juries" as a conceivable criterion for
constitutionally distinguishing a case that must go to the jury under the
331Seventh Amendment from a case that need not go to the jury.
Subsequent cases revealed that the Court was not prepared to replace the
traditional historical test with a purely functional approach.332 Scholars
have pointed out several problems with a purely functional approach.333
First, a functional approach has no direct historical support.3 34  Also,
disagreement exists concerning the particular functions a jury is best able to
perform and the types of cases a jury is best suited to hear.335 Finally, a
functional approach would provide federal judges with extraordinary
discretion to determine whether a jury hears a particular case, which is
inconsistent with the Framers' conception of the jury trial right as a strong
civilian check on the power of the judge.336
Despite the fact that an explicitly functional approach has not been
adopted by the Court, the Markman and Del Monte Dunes decisions
indicate that in the absence of historical information, the Court is willing to
11469, *33-*36, 11 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 447 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (deciding that in a
FMLA-retaliation case, genuine issue of material fact raised on whether employer
terminated employee for requesting FMLA leave; causation to be determined by jury);
BNA, Former County Employee Wins $4.75 Million in Potential First Verdict under
Arizona Law, DAILY LAB. REPORT, Oct. 17, 2005, at A-I (reporting that a jury returned a
multi-million dollar verdict in a retaliation claim under Arizona whistleblower law).
331. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537 n.10 (1970) (discussing the limitations of
juries as a distinguishing factor to prevent a case from going to a jury).
332. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 567
n.4 (1990) (declaring that the court is hesitant to rely on whether the issues are "typical
grist" for the jury's judgment as an independent basis for extending the right to a jury trial
under the Seventh amendment); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 40 n.4
(1989) (stating that the court does not declare that the Seventh Amendment provides a right
to a jury trial on all legal rather than equitable claims).
333. See Moses, supra note 185, at 239 ("Giving the court the power to determine on a
functional basis if an issue should go to a jury would essentially abrogate the constitutional
guarantee of the right to a jury trial"); Wolfram, supra note 178, at 644 (listing several
reasons why a functional approach is problematic).
334. Wolfram, supra note 178, at 719 (recalling that there was some debate about
whether there should be a constitutional guarantee of jury trial but "none of these seem to
have contemplated that these issues of utility could be evolved into a standard for
determining the extent of the right to jury trial").
335. Id. at 644.
336. Moses, supra note 185, at 239 ("Giving the court the power to determine on a
functional basis if an issue should go to the jury would essentially abrogate the
constitutional guarantee of the fight to a jury trial"); Wolfram, supra note 178, at 644
(stating several reasons why a functional approach is problematic).
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consider the relative abilities and limitations of the judge and jury in
determining whether, in an action in which the right to jury trial attaches, a
particular issue within the action should go to the jury.337 In making such a
determination, the Court has indicated that it will be guided by the jury's
primary role as a fact finder.338
For the aforementioned reasons, it is unlikely that the Court will
discard the historical test in favor of a purely functional approach. If the
Court does adopt a purely functional approach, which attempts to separate
types of cases that must be tried to the jury from types of cases that need
not be tried to the jury, the SOX whistleblower action should be the type of
case that is tried to a jury because juries have the requisite skills to
determine whether an employee was fired for whistleblowing. Similarly, if
the status quo remains in force, the Seventh Amendment requires a jury to
make factual findings on most of the elements of a SOX action.339
2. Congressional Control of Jury Trials on Statutory Claims
Various scholars, including Stanton Krauss, Rachael Schwartz, and
Kenneth Klein, reject the historical test of the Seventh Amendment and
conclude that, with respect to statutorily created federal laws, no jury right
exists under the Seventh Amendment unless Congress specifically provides
for a jury right in the statute itself.340 They contend that the Seventh
Amendment merely states that the Constitution does not prohibit jury trials,
note that jury trials make sense in some civil cases, and specify that
Congress has plenary power to decide in which situations a right to jury
trial should be preserved.34' In an era in which Congress has federalized
much of what was previously a part of the common law and has created
new legal rights that would have formerly been developed through the
337. See supra note 185.
338. Id.
339. See supra Part III.A.3.
340. See Klein, supra note 179, at 1036 ("The Seventh Amendment can be read as the
simple instruction that it is: If a legislature creates, by statute, a legal right which heretofore
did not exist, the legislature can determine whether trial of that right should be to a jury, but
in all other instances a litigant has an absolute right to a jury trial in a civil case in federal
court."); Krauss, supra note 182, at 483 ("In sum, the theory that the Jury Trial Clause gave
Congress plenary authority to determine the extent of the right to civil jury trial in the
federal courts comports with all of the early historical evidence .... [T]hat theory should be
considered the original understanding of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.");
Schwartz, supra note 177, at 629-30 ("The alternative interpretation places the judgment as
to when specific types of civil cases are best tried by juries in the hands of Congress. This
interpretation not only accords with the expressed intentions of the Framers (demonstrated
by contemporary writings), but also provides a far more workable standard for the courts to
apply.").
341. See supra note 340.
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common law, the Seventh Amendment's role as a protector of the
fundamental importance of the jury in civil cases in federal court will be
abrogated, if their view is correct. Such an approach which would
represent a paradigm shift in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, and
should be scrutinized with the utmost care. If, however, these scholars are
correct, there is no right to a jury trial in a SOX federal court action
because Congress did not specifically provide for a jury right. The
interpretation of SOX that implies a right to jury trial is unpersuasive if this
alternative view of the Seventh Amendment ever carries the day. In that
brave new world, Congress must specifically provide for a jury trial right in
the statute for such a right to exist. It did not do so in the SOX statute.
3. A Historical Vision of the Jury and its applicability to SOX
Scholars have suggested an array of approaches to interpret and apply
the Seventh Amendment to civil claims in federal court. 342  Each has
various arguments that can be made both for and against.343  Yet, in
evaluating whether the right to jury trial on a SOX whistleblower action in
federal court is constitutionally protected, I cannot help but intuitively
gravitate to the historical vision of the jury that is outlined in current Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. This vision "focuses on the centrality of the
institution of the jury in our system of government of the people, by the
people, and for the people" and acts as "a means by which ordinary people
can exercise governmental power to vindicate the community's sense of
right."344  Like Vikram David Amar, I question whether the Sixth
Amendment view of the jury should also guide our understanding of the
Seventh Amendment.3 45 It is questionable whether the Framers who meant
to ensure that a twelve-member jury, not a lone judge, stand as a bulwark
against governmental tyranny, would have also wanted that same
institution to judge the whistleblower claims of those who stand up to
corporate wrongdoing. If so, as twenty-first century Americans, we might
also consider whether any parallels exist between the community interest in
having a criminal jury determine the guilt or innocence of those Enron
executives accused of criminal law violations and the community interest
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Vikram David Amar, Implementing an Historical Vision of the Jury in an Age of
Administrative Factfinding and Sentencing Guidelines, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 291, 293-94
(2005) ("The basic constitutional vision underlying the Booker/Blakely/Apprendi line of
cases focuses on the centrality of the institution of the jury in our system of government of
the people, by the people, and for the people.").
345. Id. at 297 ("In other words, although the Apprendi line relies on jury rights under
the Sixth Amendment, ought not the vision of the jury it reflects inform our understanding
of the Seventh Amendment, which covers civil juries in federal courts as well?").
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in having a civil jury determine whether a whistleblower was fired for
engaging in SOX-protected activity. I find that in this era of the "vanishing
civil jury trial," the fundamental importance of the civil jury as a
constitutional actor has never been more critical.346 Whether SOX
whistleblower claims in federal courts are to be tried by juries is something
in which all of us, as citizens, have a stake. I would rather see this
historical vision of the jury, as opposed to a strict convenience and
efficiency consideration, influence the constitutional decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The structure, language, and purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
whistleblower provision indicate that courts should imply the right to a jury
trial as a matter of statutory interpretation. In addition, the Seventh
Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial under the static historical
test applied by the Supreme Court because a SOX action is analogous to an
English common-law action and SOX damages remedies are legal in
nature. In general, the jury in a SOX case in federal court should make
factual findings on the elements of a SOX action, the causation element in
particular, and damages. The judge in a SOX case will resolve the other
issues in the case, which constitute questions of law.
346. Justice Nathan L. Hecht, The Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: Trends in Texas Courts
and an Uncertain Future, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 163, 163 (2005) (documenting the "steady,
steep, decades-long decline" in the number of jury trials in Texas courts).
